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INTRODUCTION
The fair use privilege of United States copyright law long
stood virtually alone among national copyright laws in providing a
flexible, open-ended copyright exception. Most countries’ copyright
statutes set out a list of narrowly defined exceptions to copyright
owners’ exclusive rights. Under such “closed catalog” regimes, uses
that do not fall within one of the narrowly defined exceptions or
limitations set out in the statute infringe copyright, unless licensed
by the copyright owner. By contrast, U.S. fair use doctrine, as codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, empowers
courts to carve out an exception for an otherwise infringing use after
weighing a set of factors on a case-by-case basis.
Thus empowered, U.S. courts have given free rein to various
new technological uses of creative expression, as well as to copying
from existing works to convey new meanings, information, or aesthetics. In the United States, Google’s Book Search Project –entailing the mass digitization of university library collections to create a
searchable database of millions of books -- was held to be fair use.1
In France, a court held Google liable for copyright infringement.2
Yet, in the face of rapid technological change, the last couple
decades have witnessed widespread interest in adopting fair use in
other countries. Fair use proponents emphasize that legislatures are
hard pressed to enact new narrowly defined exceptions and limitations that keep up with the rapid changes wrought by digital technology in markets and media for producing, distributing, and
consuming creative expression. Indeed, fair use advocates view the

1

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2 nd Cir. 2015).
Editions du Seuil v. Google Inc., T.G.I. Paris, 79 PTCJ 226, 1/1/10 (Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris 3ème Chamber, Dec 18, 2009).
2
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pliable copyright exception as a vital engine “for innovation and investment in innovation,” a driving force behind the dramatic success
of American technology companies.3 Nor, they argue, can a closed
catalog of narrowly defined exceptions capture the full panoply of
creative, secondary uses that enrich our culture, enhance our public
discourse, or provide useful information. By contrast, judges can
more adeptly apply open-ended standards and principles in cases
brought before them to rule that certain socially beneficial uses do
not infringe copyright.
Thus far, the fair use model has been adopted, with some
variation, in a dozen countries.4 They include the Philippines

3

IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44 (2011) [hereinafter “HARGREAVES REVIEW”]. See
also AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMM’N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 104-08 (2013) (lauding fair use as an engine for innovation); COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM’N, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93 (2013) (advocating adoption of fair use to spur innovation in Ireland). For a seminal
discussion of how fair use might spur innovation, see Fred von Lohmann, Fair
Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008).
4
By “fair use model” we mean a copyright exception that applies a flexible set of
factors, including or drawing upon the four factors in U.S. fair use, and in which
courts are empowered to apply the exception to uses beyond those that are specifically enumerated in statutory provisions setting out the exception,even if the enumerated uses impose some constraint on the court’s discretion. As we discuss
below, the U.S. fair use provision sets out a list of favored uses that are entirely
illustrative examples, while the fair use law of countries such as Israel sets out a
list of uses that is understood to impose some outside limit on which types of uses
may qualify as fair use. Cf. Sean Flynn and and Mike Palmedo, The User Rights
Database: Measuring the Impact of Copyright Balance, available at SSRN
3082371 (2017) (characterizing “fair use” as completely open, flexible, and general).
For a helpful collection and typology of fair use model adoptions, see JONATHAN
BAND AND JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (Policybandwidth 2013); Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS 1
(2018) [hereinafter Yu, Customizing Transplants]. Fair use is not the only openended copyright exception that proponents have advanced. Some proposals would
fashion an open-ended copyright exception from the three-step test set out in several multilateral intellectual property treaties as a limit on permissible copyright
exceptions and limitation. See, e.g., ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Recommendation 11 (2006).

4
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(1997),5 Liberia (1997),6 Sri Lanka (2003),7 Singapore (2004),8
Canada (2004),9 Israel (2007),10 Taiwan (2007),11 South Korea

5

Section 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (Republic Act
No. 8293) is virtually identical to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act except
that it states explicitly that the decompilation of a computer program “may also
constitute fair use.”
6
Section 2.7 of the Copyright Law of the Republic of Liberia is virtually identical
to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, except that it does not apply to the
reproduction of a computer program.
7
Sections 11 of Sri Lanka’s Intellectual Property Act (Act No. 36 of 2003) is
virtually identical to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright, but includes a long list of
specific uses that are to be permitted without the copyright owner’s authorization
and refers to those uses as “acts of fair use.”.
8
Singapore Copyright Act (Chapter 63), Sections 35-37 (setting out a “fair dealing” exception that is structured as an open-ended fair use exception). .
9
Canada’s fair dealing exception was long thought to provide a closed list of uses
that could qualify for the exception. But beginning in 2004, the Canadian Supreme
Court has ruled that the specific permitted uses enumerated in Canada’s fair dealing statute must be given a large and liberal interpretation and thus impose a low
threshold, and that, in determining fairness, courts are to apply factors that overlap
with those of U.S. fair use. Those rulings, together with Canadian Parliament’s
addition of parody, satire, and education to the list of enumerated uses, has
brought a leading Canadian copyright scholar to conclude that “the current Canadian fair dealing regime now more closely resembles a flexible, open-ended fair
use model.” Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from
Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
157 (Michael Geist ed., 2013)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY]; see also Ariel Katz, Fair Use 2.0; The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in COPYRIGHT
PENTALOGY, id., at 93.
10
We discuss the relevant provision, Section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007,
in detail in the text below.
11
Copyright Act 2016 art. 65, translated in Intellectual Property Office,
https://www.tipo.gov.tw/public/data/61221027271.pdf (Taiwan).
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(2011),12 Malaysia (2012),13 Kenya (2014),14 Ecuador (2016),15 and
South Africa (2018).16 China also appears poised to adopt an openended copyright exception in a proposed revision to its copyright
law, and some Chinese courts have already asserted the authority to
permit uses that do not appear in the closed list of exceptions currently enumerated in China’s copyright statute.17 Copyright revision commissions in Australia, the European Union, Hong Kong,

12

Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 14,083, Mar.
22, 2016, art. 35-3 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Copyright Commission,
https://www.copyright.or.kr/eng/laws-and-treaties/copyright-law/chapter02/section04.do; see also Sang Jo Jong, Fair Use in Korea, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Feb.
27, 2017), http://infojustice.org/archives/37819 (offering a brief discussion of the
origin and operation of the fair use provision in South Korea).
13
Copyright Act, 2012, arts. 9, 13 (Malaysia), translated in BAND AND GERAFI,
supra note 4Error! Bookmark not defined., at 38.
14
See Victor B. Nzomo, In the Public Interest: How Kenya Quietly Shifted from
Fair Dealing to Fair Use, WIPO-WTO IP Colloquium Research Paper Series
2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929252, discussing
Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR.
15
Organic Code on the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation
(Ecuador), arts 211-12. Article 212 of Ecuador’s copyright statute sets out a list
of types of uses that are presumptively permitted so long as they meet the flexible
test of factors, modelled on those in U.S. fair use doctrine, set out in Article 211.
But Article 211 also envisions that uses other than the favored uses enumerated
in Article 212 may qualify as fair use. We are indebted to Ecuadorian copyright
expert, Byron Robayo, of the Quito law firm Paz Horowitz Abogados S.A., for
clarifying this point.
16
Republic of South Africa, Copyright Amendment Bill B 13B—2017. The Bill
has been enacted but not yet signed into law. Peter Yu has authored especially
helpful, illuminating studies of fair use variants in other countries. See Yu, Customizing Transplants, supra note 4; Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 111 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm
Evolution].
17
See Yu, Customizing Transplants, supra note4, at 11 (describing China’s proposed Article 43). In 2011 The Beijing Higher Court ruled in 2013 that, in exceptional circumstances, uses that are not among the enumerated exceptions in
China’s Copyright Law may qualify as permitted uses. Google, Inc. v. Shen
Wang, No. 1221 Gaominzhongzi (Beijing Higher Ct. 2013), described in Yong
Wan, Similar Facts, Different Outcomes: A Comparative Study of the Google
Books Projects Case in China and the United States, 63 J. Copyright Soc’y USA
573 (2016).
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Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have considered, or are considering, adopting elements of fair use in those jurisdictions as well.18
Yet, ironically, U.S. copyright industries – motion picture
studios, record labels, music publishers, and print publishers -- and,
in some instances, U.S. government representatives have steadfastly
opposed the transplanting of U.S. fair use to other countries. U.S.
copyright industries have repeatedly lobbied other countries not to
adopt the U.S. fair use privilege. Further, the Intellectual Property
Alliance (“IIPA”), a leading copyright industry trade association,
has repeatedly cited countries’ “ill-advised” adoption of fair use in
petitioning the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to exercise that
agency’s statutory authority to threaten those countries with trade
sanctions for inadequately protecting intellectual property rights.19
In turn, the USTR and U.S. State Department have joined with the
copyright industries to oppose adoption of fair use in other countries
and in international copyright treaties, even though they have repeatedly promoted global enactment of other provisions of U.S. copyright law.20 They argue, principally, that, while fair use works
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N [ALRC], COPYRIGHT AND THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 123-60 (2013) (recommending the introduction of a fair use exception); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE
RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU
COPYRIGHT RULES 33-36 (July 2014) (reporting on consultations regarding
whether the E.U. should provide for greater flexibility for copyright exceptions
and limitations, including in the form of a fair use provision); COPYRIGHT
REVIEW COMM., MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93-94 (2013) (Jr.) (recommending the introduction of the fair use exception as a new Section 49A of the
Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act); LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
AMENDMENTS TO BE MOVED BY THE HONOURABLE CHAN KAMLAM, SBS, JP 4 (2015) (Hong Kong), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/counmtg/papers/cm20151209cb3-219-e.pdf (LC Paper No. CB(3) 219/1516) (providing the text of the fair use proposal presented for legislative debate in
Hong Kong); HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3 Error! Bookmark not defined. (United Kingdom); ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006) (United Kingdom); Tatsuhiro Ueno, Rethinking
the Provisions on Limitations of Rights in the Japanese Copyright Act--Toward a
Japanese-Style “Fair Use” Clause, 34 AIPPI J. 159 (2009) (Japan). The New
Zealand government considered but rejected adopting fair use. See Lior Zemer,
Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the
Case of Fair Use, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 1051, 1096 n. 271 (2011).
19
See text accompanying notes _infra.
20
See Yu, Customizing Fair Use, supra note 4, at 3-4, noting that the United States
has pushed other countries to adopt broad protections for copyright holders found
18
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reasonably well in the U.S., foreign courts that lack the 150 years of
U.S. fair use precedent would be highly susceptible to applying the
fair use exception in a chaotic, libertine manner, thus seriously undermining copyright protection.
This Article tests the credibility of that blanket U.S. opposition. In so doing, we present the first comprehensive study of how
courts have actually applied fair use in a country outside the United
States.21 We look to Israel as a case study to test the claims of opponents of adopting the fair use model outside the United States.
Israel’s legislature, the “Knesset,” enacted fair use as part of
that country’s general copyright law revision, codified in Israel’s
Copyright Law 2007.22 Israel’s fair use provision, Section 19 of the
Copyright Law 2007, is a close translation of Section 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act (with a couple key differences that we note below).
Yet, like in other countries that have considered adopting fair use,
U.S. copyright industries voiced the objection that transplanting fair
use to Israel would severely undermine copyright owners’ rights.23
We report below the results of our quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the first decade of fair use case law in Israel. We
also compare Israeli fair use doctrine with that of the United States,
drawing on parallel empirical studies of U.S fair use case law.
Our study has significance for the global fair use debate,
even recognizing that Israel’s copyright law and legal system may
well differ in important respects from those of other countries.24 As
noted above, ours is the first comprehensive study of how courts
in the U.S. Copyright Act, but has actively opposed the adoption fair use in domestic legislation and treaties.
21
See Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics – at Home and Abroad, in
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 234, 261 (Ruth L.
Okediji, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS] (noting that “it is time to start monitoring
[the jurisdictions that have adopted fair use] to see how the new provisions are
being applied by the courts”).
22
Israel Copyright Law, 5768-2007. Prior to enactment of that general copyright
revision, which took effect on May 25, 2008, the Israel copyright law was the
U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, as supplemented and amended by the U.K. Copyright Ordinance of 1924.
23
See notes – infra and accompanying text.
24
Given that Israel’s legal system is a common law system, our study does not
address the claim that fair use, as a creature of the common law, has no place in
civil law systems. For an illuminating critique of that claim, see Martin
Senftleben, The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231 (2017).
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outside the United States have applied fair use. In addition, Israel’s
adoption of fair use has been repeatedly cited in deliberations in
other countries that are considering whether to follow suit.25 Israel’s
experience with fair use might be viewed with particular interest in
other countries given Israel’s prominence as a knowledge-based
economy, sometimes called start-up nation,26 where the high-tech
industry and technological innovation are important drivers of economic growth. Fair use proponents argue that in such an environment, which relies on frequent technological advances, the
flexibility offered by fair use is likely to be essential.27
Our study plausibly supports two general conclusions of relevance to the global debate about fair use.28 First, our findings counter the sweeping claim, repeatedly advanced by U.S. copyright
industries and other fair use opponents, that the adoption of fair use
outside the United States will inevitably open the floodgates to massive uncompensated copying and dissemination of authors’ creative
expression. As we discuss, far from seeing fair use as a “free ticket
to copy,” Israeli courts actually ruled against fair use at a far greater
rate than did their American counterparts during the ten-year period
of our study.
Of course, whatever has been Israel’s experience, courts in
Liberia, Ecuador, or another country might still interpret fair use in
some manner that U.S. copyright industries regard as anathema. But
Israeli case law following Israel’s enactment of fair use demonstrates that the mere fact that judges outside the United States lack
the experience of U.S. judges in applying fair use and the guidance
of decades of U.S. fair use precedent does not necessarily lead to a
chaotic or wide open interpretation of fair use. Indeed, the Israel experience thus far raises the distinct possibility that courts in other
countries might apply the user privilege more narrowly than do their
U.S. counterparts. At the very least, U.S. opposition to transplanting
25

See, e.g., Australian Government Productivity Commission, Intellectual Property Arrangements; Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 78 (September
23, 2016) at p. 9. HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, 5.18, at 45 (U.K.).
26
DAN SENOR AND SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL’S
ECONOMIC MIRACLE (2009). .
27
See, e.g., Letter of Google Australia, dated July 4, 2018, to Australia’s Department of Communications and the Arts, as part of the Department’s Copyright Law
Modernization consultation.
28
We take no position on claims of U.S. technology companies and other fair use
proponents that fair use is highly conducive to technological innovation. Such
claims are beyond the scope of our study of case law.
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fair use should be assessed against additional case studies of how
fair use has actually been applied in other countries. Certainly, the
USTR should give no weight to the mere fact that a country has
adopted fair use in determining whether that country adequately protects intellectual property rights within the meaning of U.S. trade
law.
Second, our case study suggests that in one respect U.S. copyright industries raise a valid point: local courts will, indeed, develop distinct versions of fair use doctrine in line with their local
jurisprudence and national policies. The courts might cite leading
U.S. fair use cases. However, they are unlikely to coalesce around a
single, uniform, America-led version of fair use. Indeed, courts may
well develop distinct local variants of fair use even in countries, like
Israel, where the legislature enacts a fair use provision that closely
tracks the language of Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
Israel’s experience should be no surprise. Local variation is
what the scholarly literature on legal transplants tells us to expect.
Courts in countries that purport to transplant statutory regimes from
elsewhere generally come to interpret – and effectively alter -- the
transplanted foreign law in line with local conditions, legal traditions, and jurisprudence.29 Israel’s adoption of fair use, in near literal
translation of the American statute, is a prime example of that phenomenon. As interpreted by Israeli courts, fair use looks quite different from the doctrine that courts have developed in the United
States. Such local variation does not mean, however, that transplanting fair use will inevitably lead to massive uncompensated copying.
That clearly has not been the case in Israel.
29

See Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1427
(2010); Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 16-22 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization
Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT. L. J. 1 (2004). As Peter Yu has illuminated with respect to fair use, countries might also enact an altered version of
a foreign statute to begin with, as the legislature seeks to tailor the foreign transplant to local law, policy, and perceived needs. See Yu, Customizing Transplants,
supra note 4; Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 16. Michael Birnhack
presents a cogent argument that courts should avoid reflexive transplantation of
foreign doctrine and should, instead, adapt foreign doctrine to local needs by understanding the doctrines theoretical underpinnings. See Michael Birnhack, Judicial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory, 5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 264
(2015).

10
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly explicate U.S. fair use doctrine and further contrast it with copyright
laws that provide a closed list of exceptions. In Part II, we document
repeated U.S. government and copyright industry opposition to fair
use in other countries and in international fora. In Part III, we chronicle Israel’s adoption of fair use and the U.S. copyright industry opposition to enacting fair use in Israel. Part IV presents our
comparative study of Israeli and U.S. fair use case law during the
decade following the effective date of the Copyright Law 2007 and
in light of a more recent, landmark ruling of the Israeli Supreme
Court.30 In Part V, we conclude.
I. FAIR USE VERSUS CLOSED LISTS OF COPYRIGHT
EXCEPTIONS
The open-ended, flexible character of U.S. fair use doctrine
presents a sharp contrast to the closed catalogue regimes in both civil
law countries and many countries that have adopted the British fair
dealing exception. At the same time, the differences between the two
regimes are not as wide as might appear. Fair use is more consistent
and predictable than critics charge, and courts in closed catalogue
regimes have carved out a degree of flexibility in the face of the
regimes’ generally restrictive character. This Part fleshes out the
fundamental contrast between fair use and closed catalogue regimes,
but also notes the ways in which courts have mitigated some of the
sharp differences. We also explicate central elements of U.S. fair
use doctrine to provide background for our comparative study of
U.S. and Israeli fair use.
A. Fair Use
Fair use is a creature of judge-made Anglo-American common law. The doctrine is widely said to have sprung from Justice
Story’s test for “a fair and bona fide abridgement,” set out in his
1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh. Yet, fair use has even earlier
roots. One can trace its origins to fair abridgement cases litigated in
English courts of law and equity extending back to 1710.31
30

C..A. 3425/17 Nestlé Societe Des Produits S.A v Espresso Club Ltd (August
7, 2019).
31
See Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371
(2011).
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When Congress codified fair use in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, it maintained the doctrine’s judge-made character. Section 107 provides that courts are to determine whether a
defendant’s use qualifies as fair use on a case-by-case basis, using
as guidelines four statutory factors gleaned from prior case law. The
Court may also consider any other factor it deems relevant. The four
statutory factors are:
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.”
Importantly, the fair use claimant need not satisfy each factor
in order for the use to qualify as fair use. Nor are the four factors
meant to set out some kind of mathematical equation whereby, if at
least three factors favor or disfavor fair use, that determines the result. Rather, the factors serve as guidelines for holistic, case-by-case
decision. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “All [factors] are to
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”32
In that vein, in its preamble paragraph, Section 107 provides
a list of several examples of the types of uses that can qualify as fair
use. The examples, which include “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, [and] research,” are often thought to be favored uses for
qualifying for fair use. Importantly, however, the list of favored uses
is not dispositive. Rather, fair use’s open-ended framework imposes
no limits on the types of uses that courts may determine are “fair.”33
32

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
As the Supreme Court has stated: “The text employs the terms ‘including’ and
‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and not limitative”
function of the examples given, which thus provide only general guidance about
the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair
uses.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 577-78 (1994) (citations
omitted).
33
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As iterated in the House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976, Section 107 was meant to give courts considerable leeway in adapting
fair use doctrine to new circumstances and technologies:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis.34
Fair use jurisprudence since 1976 is very much in line with
that Congressional intent. In interpreting and applying Section 107,
U.S. courts have repeatedly exercised the flexibility accorded to
them to determine the types of uses that may qualify as “fair.” Notably, these include new uses made possible by digital technology
that Congress could not have contemplated in 1976 and thus that do
not appear among examples of uses enumerated in Section 107.
Courts have made clear, for example, that user-posted remixes on
social media, digital sampling of recorded music, displaying copyrighted material in search engine results, and mass digitization of
books and other works may all qualify as fair use, depending on the
particular facts of each case.35 U.S. courts have also recognized fair
use not only in traditional fair use categories like scholarship, news

34

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). See also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 875-77 (1987)
(summarizing the House Hearings on Fair Use).
35
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9 th Cir. 2007) (image
search engine results); Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th
Cir. 2005) (fair use defense may be available for digital sampling of sound recording even if de minimis copying defense is not); Estate of Barre v. Carter, 272
F.Supp.3d 906, 930 (E.D. Louisiana 2017) (holding that digital sampling may
qualify as fair use but that fair use defense was not sufficient to support a motion
to dismiss under the facts as alleged in the complaint); Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (sender of DMCA notice to take down userposted video featuring copyrighted music must consider fair use); Authors Guild
v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2015) (mass digitization and search engine
results).
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reporting, and parody, but also in using existing works as raw material for new expressive purposes and aesthetics.36
Fair use’s flexible, open-ended character has led some critics, both within the U.S. and without, to charge that the doctrine is
arbitrary, ad hoc, and unpredictable.37 Yet empirical studies of fair
use case law have cast considerable doubt on that claim. Contrary to
the charge that fair use is wholly unpredictable, the empirical studies
uncover considerable order and consistency in fair use case law. For
example, Barton Beebe’s quantitative, empirical study and regression analysis illuminates which factors and sub-factors exert the
most influence on fair use case law.38 Likewise, Pamela Samuelson
finds consistency in fair use precedent by creating a taxonomy of
uses.39 She discovers greater predictability of results when we examine like cases based on the type of use than when we look at fair
use case law as a whole. Further, Matthew Sag presents a regression
analysis finding statistically significant correlations between case
outcomes and combinations of various factual variables, such as the
legal identify of the parties and whether the defendant used the
plaintiff’s work as part of a commercial product or service.40
In addition, one of us, Neil Netanel, has shown that identifying historical trends in fair use case law makes further sense of fair
use.41 The Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.42 initiated a dramatic shift in fair use doctrine, a shift
that took several years fully to take hold. In fundamental ways, fair
use is a different doctrine today than it was twenty or thirty years
ago. So if we compare fair use cases from the 1980s to present-day
cases, it is no wonder that fair use might look like a chaotic mix of
36

See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 60910 (2nd Cir. 2006) (use of concert poster art to illustrate a biography of rock band);
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013)(use of photographs in art
work); A.V. ex. rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009)
(student papers copied for plagiarism detection service).
37
See Neil W. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
715,716-17 (2011) (quoting critics).
38
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008).
39
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
40
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012). See also Michael
J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004) (presenting a more theoretical, but also illuminating systematization
of fair use doctrine).
41
Netanel, supra note 37.
42
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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ad hoc, contradictory decisions. By contrast, if we compare only
cases decided over the past fifteen years or so, we find far greater
consistency. In particular, the issue that overwhelmingly dominates
fair use analysis today is whether and to what extent the defendant’s
use is “transformative,” a term that Campbell introduced to fair use
case law. But prior to the doctrinal shift initiated by Campbell, the
dominant questions in fair use analysis were, instead, whether the
defendant’s use was “commercial” and whether the use harmed the
potential market for the plaintiff’s work.43
Jiarui Liu’s empirical research also highlights the emerging
dominance and far-reaching impact of the transformative use approach to fair use in the United States. In his comprehensive study
of fair use rulings from January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the
Copyright Act of 1976) to January 1, 2017, Liu found that, in the
decade preceding 2017, close to 90% of fair use cases considered
whether the defendant’s use is “transformative.”44 Moreover, if a
U.S. court finds the defendant’s use to be “transformative,” it will
almost inevitably rule that the use is a fair use (unless the court characterizes the use as only “somewhat” or “minimally” transformative). Liu found that in 94% of cases in which the court found the
use to be transformative, the court went on to hold that the use was
fair use. By contrast, the same lopsided percentage, 94%, of nontransformative uses were held not to be fair use.45
The definition of what uses qualify as transformative is thus
obviously key to unpacking fair use doctrine. In that regard, first and
foremost, a use is “transformative” if the alleged copyright infringer
has used the copyrighted work for a fundamentally different expressive purpose from that of the work’s author. Copying a work for
purposes of parody or criticism of the original work would be a paradigmatic transformative use.
Importantly, a use for a fundamentally different expressive
purpose may qualify as transformative even if the alleged infringer
43

See Netanel, supra note 37, at 734-46.
Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 166, 175 (2019).
45
See id., at 167, 180. A more recently published quantitative empirical study of
all district court and appellate court fair use opinions between 1991 and 2017 similarly concludes that fair use outcomes correlate overwhelmingly with whether
the court finds that the defendant’s use is transformative, but also notes that only
about half of defendants win the transformative use inquiry. See Clark D. Asay,
Arielle Sloan, and Dean Sobczak, Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61
B.C. L. REV. 905 (2020).
44
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copies the work in its entirety without altering it.46 Google’s digitization of books was held to be “highly transformative” because
Google copied them and displayed short snippets of text relevant to
search queries for the “purpose of enabling a search for identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher,” not to
enable the public to read the books.47 The publisher of an illustrated
history of the Grateful Dead made a transformative use of images of
Grateful Dead concert posters that it featured in the book because
the original posters served the purposes of concert promotion and
artistic expression, while the defendant copied them as “artifacts to
document and represent” historical events.48
More controversially, some courts have held that copying for
the same general expressive purpose, while using the original as raw
material for a “drastically different … aesthetic,” may also qualify
as a transformative use.49 For example, the Second Circuit held that
the artist, Prince, made fair use of black-and-white photographs that
depicted the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their Jamaican surroundings. Key for the court was that Prince had incorporated the
photographs into hectic and provocative artworks that manifested an
entirely distinct aesthetic, with fundamental differences in composition, presentation, scale, color palette and media.50 A user remix
encompassing bits of popular movies and music recordings thus

46

See Liu, supra note 44, at 170 (finding that of the decisions finding different
expressive purpose, but no physical modification of the original work, 60.7%
found the use to be transformative).
47
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216-18 (2nd Cir. 2015).
48
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2nd
Cir. 2006).
49
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013). In his comprehensive
study of transformative use case law, Liu compares fair use outcomes for cases
involving transformative purpose but no physical transformation with those in
which the defendant physically modified the copyrighted work but did so with the
same expressive purpose as original author. Liu finds that courts ruled in favor
of fair use in 60.7% of the cases involving transformative purpose but no physical
transformation, but in favor of fair use in just 32.7% of the cases involving physical transformation but no transformative purpose. Liu, supra note 44, at 205.
50
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013). See also Seltzer v. Green
Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding to be a transformative use
a rock band's use of artist's illustration of screaming face in video backdrop of its
stage show as raw material to convey a different expressive message and meaning).
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might qualify as a transformative use on grounds of different expressive purpose if it comments on the original or some social phenomenon or on grounds of drastically different aesthetic.
Notably, as Liu’s findings indicate, while uses found to be
transformative will almost always be held to be fair use, non-transformative uses may also qualify, albeit in relatively few cases. Most
famously, the Supreme Court held in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., that consumers’ analog recording of television programs for later viewing is fair use.51 Lower courts have
subsequently extended Sony to digital recordings of television programs and to reproducing a copy of a work that a consumer legally
owns in order to transfer it from one consumer device to another.52
Finally, of importance in comparing fair use to closed catalogue regimes, fair use is not the only exception to copyright holder
rights in U.S. law. Rather, Section 107 stands alongside lengthy, detailed provisions, Sections 108 to 122 of the Copyright Act that set
out a long list of narrowly tailored exceptions and limitations for
uses ranging from public performance of music in retail establishments to making audio and braille copies for the visually impaired.
In comparing the U.S. fair use model with closed catalog regimes, it
is important to highlight that U.S. fair use operates independently
from those narrowly tailored exceptions and limitations.53 No copyright holder authorization is required for uses that meet the requirements of one of the specific exceptions or limitations, regardless of
whether the use might or might not qualify as fair use. And, unlike
close catalog copyright systems, a use that qualifies as fair use is
noninfringing even if it does not fall within any of the specific exceptions and limitations.

51

464 U.S. 417 (1984). Recently, the Second Circuit has sought to recast Sony as
a transformative use case. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649,
661 (2nd Cir. 2018), quoting Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d
169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (“In Sony, the ‘apparent reasoning was that a secondary
use may be a fair use if it utilizes technology to achieve the transformative purpose
of improving the efficiency of delivering content without unreasonably encroaching on the commercial entitlements of the rights holder’”….)
52
See, e.g, Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060,
1068-70 (9th Cir. 2014).
53
See Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra
note 21, at 12 (discussing policy justifications for and interplay between fair use
and enumerated exceptions and limitations in U.S. copyright law).
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B. Closed List Copyright Exceptions
1. Civil Law Regimes

Until the late 1990s, the United States was the only country
in the world with an open-ended fair use privilege. Copyright laws
of continental European and other civil law countries typically set
out a closed list of narrowly defined permitted uses. For example,
Article L122-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code provides
that once an author has disclosed his or her work to the public, the
author may not prohibit (1) “private and gratuitous performances
carried out exclusively within the family circle,” (2) “copies …
made from a lawful source, and strictly for private use,” (3) “short
quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific
or information of the work to which they are incorporated,” “press
reviews,” (4) “the dissemination … by the press or television, as
current news … of speeches intended for the public made in political, administrative, judicial, or academic proceedings,” (5) “parody,
pastiche, and caricature,” (6) noncommercial reproductions made
for purposes of conservation or preservation and accessible from
within publicly accessible libraries, museums, or archives; and (7) a
couple additional similarly narrow and expressly defined uses.54
Similarly, the European Union’s Copyright in the Information Society Directive of 2001 lists twenty specific exceptions and limitations
that member states are entitled to enact.55 Pursuant to the Copyright
in the Information Society Directive, EU country copyright statutes
provide that copying or publicly communicating a copyright-protected work in a manner that the statute does not expressly identify
as a copyright exception requires the copyright owner’s permission
– and, absent permission, infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights.
Further, courts may not fashion new exceptions, and the traditional rule in many countries, including those of the European Union, is that copyright limitations and exceptions must be narrowly
construed.56 It does not matter how socially beneficially the use
54

Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 1 juin 2019).
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society [hereinafter EU Copyright Directive], Art. 5.
56
But see Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS,
55
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might be or whether it is a type of use that the legislature did not and
could not have contemplated when it enacted the relevant provision
of the copyright statute. Consequently, Google’s scanning of millions of library books was held to be infringing under French copyright law. For that matter, Google’s library partners’ creation of a
searchable database of those books would also infringe because
France’s exception for copying by libraries and archives is limited
to copying for purposes of preservation. By contrast, the Second Circuit held that the digital copying of library books by Google’s library partners to establish an online searchable database qualified as
fair use, just as a different Second Circuit panel held that Google
itself had made fair use of the books that it digitized.57
Of note, some closed catalog regimes also include an openended standard like fair use. The EU Copyright in the Information
Society Directive, for example, incorporates the three-step test that
has become standard in intellectual property treaties, including the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. However, the three-step
test operates to impose a restriction on the specific exceptions and
limitations set out in the Directive, not as an open-ended, flexible
exception like fair use. Article 5(5) of the Directive provides that the
specific exceptions and limitations “shall only be applied in [1] certain special cases which [2] do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and [3] do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”58 Unlike fair
use, the Copyright Directive’s three-step test is not a freestanding
exception that may be applied even if the use falls outside the specific exceptions or limitations. Nor are the specific exceptions and
limitations independent from the three-step test. Per Article 5(5), a
specific exception or limitation may only be applied in a particular
case if doing so would comport with the three-step test.59

supra note 21, at 275, 284-85 (discussing the three-step test constraint and traditional rule of narrow construction but noting that recent decisions of the Court of
Justice of the European Union “reflect a more liberal manner of interpreting limitations and exceptions,” even while “still providing lip service to the rule of narrow construction”).
57
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2 nd Cir. 2014).
58
EU Copyright Directive, supra note 55, Art. 5(5).
59
Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, CJEU , Case C-476/17, Paragraph 62 (2019).
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2. Fair Dealing Regimes

The United Kingdom and former British colonies and dominions that followed its example provide for a “fair dealing” exception to copyright. Fair dealing differs in some respects from the
civil law approach to copyright exceptions. But, today, fair dealing
is also typically understood to permit only a closed list of exceptions.60
Until 1911, United Kingdom fair dealing doctrine was much
like American fair use.61 Courts had wide latitude to determine fairness, unconstrained by any statutorily mandated closed list.62 As
such, UK courts permitted fair abridgement as needed to prevent
copyright from putting “manacles upon science.”63 However, in
1911 Parliament codified fair dealing case law in a provision that
courts have interpreted to enumerate a closed list of uses to which
the exception could apply. The U.K. Copyright Law of 1911 provided that “any fair dealing with any work for the purpose of private
study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary” did not
constitute copyright infringement.64 Former British colonies and dominions such as Australia,65 Canada,66 India,67 New Zealand,68 and
60

Singapore and Sri Lanka, two British Commonwealth countries that each recently enacted an open-ended exception modelled on fair use, are exceptions to
that general rule. They continue to denominate the exception as “fair dealing”
rather than adopting the “fair use” appellation.
61
See Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright
Dominion and the Case of Fair Use, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 1051, 1074 (2011).
62
See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 17 Vesey 422 (Eng.) (holding that “a legitimate use of a publication in the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the
character of an original work” does not infringe copyright); Smith v. Chato,
(1874) 31 L.T. 77 (Eng.).
63
Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (Eng.).
64
Copyright Act 1911, §2(1)(i) (U.K.). As Ariel Katz has cogently argued, it is
far from clear that Parliament intended to set out a closed list rather than a list of
illustrative examples. But courts in the U.K. and other countries have generally,
albeit perhaps not decisively, interpreted the 1911 fair dealing exception to set out
a closed list. See Ariel Katz, Debunking the Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth: Have
We had Fair Use All Along?, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Shyam Balganesh, Wee Loon Ng-Loy, and
Haochen Sun, eds, Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020).
65
See Copyright Act 1968, pt. III, div. 3 (cth) (Austl.).
66
See Copyright Act R.S. 1921, § 29 (Can.).
67
See The Copyright Act, No. 49 of 1999, [India Code] ch. XI (1957), Vol. 14
(Ind.).
68
See Copyright Act 1994, §§ 42-43 (N.Z.).
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South Africa69 enacted similar closed-list versions of fair dealing.
Likewise, of particular relevance to our study, the U.K. Copyright
Law of 1911, including the closed-list fair dealing exception, took
effect in British Mandate Palestine following World War I and was
incorporated into Israeli law upon the establishment of the State of
Israel in 1948.70
Courts in the UK and elsewhere have applied various judgemade factors to determine whether a use meets the test of “fairness.”
But with the notable recent exception of Canada’s Supreme Court,
they have held that even if the test of fairness is met, fair dealing
cannot apply to types of uses that are not listed in the statute. 71 Rather, like the European Copyright Directive’s rule regarding the
three-step test, “fairness” operates only as a constraint on applying
the exception to listed uses in particular cases. Even if a particular
use falls within one of enumerated purposes, it will not qualify as
“fair dealing” unless it would be “fair” to exempt the use from copyright holder authorization under the circumstances. The United
Kingdom’s current fair dealing provisions, as set out in the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, similarly enumerate a closed
list of exceptions to copyright, in line with the European Union Copyright Directive.72
C. Some Perspective on the Differences
The fair use and closed catalog models differ substantially in
their basic approach to carving out exceptions to copyright owner
rights. However, the differences are not quite as stark as might appear.
From the fair use side, as the empirical studies have shown,
U.S. fair use does not truly operate as a fully open-ended, standardbased regime in the sense that courts exercise virtually unbridled
discretion to weigh the equities in each individual case. Rather, U.S.
courts tend to coalesce around more precise rules for standard fact
69

See Copyright Act 98 of 1978, § 12 (S. Afr.).
See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN MANDATE PALESTINE (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
71
See LIONEL BENTLY AND BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 193
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2004) (under UK fair dealing doctrine the dealing
must be fair for the one or more of the purposes set out in the closed list).
72
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, §§ 29-31 (Eng.).
70
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patterns. For example, copying for purpose of parody, criticism of
the copied work, introduction of the work in evidence in litigation
(unless the copied work was initially created for possible use in litigation), and comparative advertising almost always qualifies as fair
use.73 As such, fair use’s flexibility lies in enabling courts effectively to tailor fair use for new uses, fact patterns, and policy
choices.
For their part, closed catalog regimes provide somewhat
greater flexibility than is often assumed. First, close catalog regimes
operate within a system of constitutional and general private law that
sometimes provides courts with openings to find flexibilities outside
the copyright statute. For example, European courts have occasionally looked to the right to free expression grounded in a national
constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights to interpret a copyright exception broadly or even to override the rules of
copyright.74 Likewise, in the Google Thumbnails case, the German
Federal Supreme Court ruled that even though Google’s display of
images through its image search engine did not fall within any copyright exception, Google’s use of the images was lawful under the
doctrine of implied consent.75 The Court reasoned that the copyright
owner had implicitly consented to the use of her images in the image
73

See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 39, at 2550-53 (parody and criticism), 259293 (litigation), 2597-99 (comparative advertising)(2009). See also Niva ElkinKoren and Orit Fishman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZONA L. REV. 161, 163
(2017); Justin Hughes, The Sub Rosa Rules of Copyright Fair Use, 34 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2020) (characterizing fair use as a mechanism for courts
to create specific exceptions that are akin to rules). For a seminal discussion of
the dynamic standards-rules continuum in property law generally, see Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1998).
74
See, e.g., Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C469/17, Court of Justice of the E.U. (29 July 2019) (stating that freedom of expression does not justify a copyright exception beyond those specified in the EU
Copyright Directive, but that the right to free expression may inform interpretation of a specified exception). See also Bernt Hugenholtz and Martin R. F.
Seftleben, Fair Use in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities, Institute for Information
Law, University of Amsterdam, November 2011, at 11 (discussing the Germania
3 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the Scientology v.
XS4ALL ruling of the Court of Appeal of the Hague, both of which permitted
extensive quotations from copyright-protected works. See also Christophe Geiger
and Elena Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of
Expression, Center for International Intellectual Property Studies Research Paper
No. 2019-02 (2019).
75
Bundesgerichtshof, April 29, 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 14-15, summarized in
Hugenholtz & Senftleben, id., at 12.
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search service by making her images available online without employing readily available technical means to block search engine’s
indexing and display of the images.
Second, a degree of flexibility can be obtained through narrowly defining the scope of authors’ exclusive rights, in particular
the right of adaptation (the equivalent of the right to prepare derivative works under U.S. copyright law). As Hugenholtz and Seftleben
point out, both Germany and the Netherlands allow a degree of freedom to adapt another’s work when the adaptation is sufficiently distinct from the underlying work.76 The relative freedom to adapt is
not defined as an exception to copyright holder rights. Rather German and Dutch courts narrowly construe the copyright holders’ exclusive right to adapt their work such that it does not extend to
adaptations that are sufficiently distinct. But the effect is similar.
German and Dutch law could conceivably give free rein to many
uses that would qualify as transformative uses under U.S. fair use
law.
That said, the fair use model still provides courts greater
flexibility to devise a copyright exception for new technological
uses, such as in the Google Book Search case, as well as to permit
exact copying for a different expressive purpose, as in the Illustrated
History of the Grateful Dead case. For that reason, several leading
European scholars have advocated adoption of fair use, or an openended exception based on the three-step test, under European law.77
II. U.S. AND COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY OPPOSITION
Motion picture studios, book publishers, and record labels have
all asserted the fair use defense in copyright infringement lawsuits
brought against them.78 Nonetheless, copyright industry trade associations and lobbyists have resolutely opposed the adoption of fair
use outside the United States.
76

Id. at 25-26.
See, e.g., See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece - the Liberation of European Copyright Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC.
COMM. L. 87, 90-91 (2010); Senftleben, supra note 26; Alexandra Sims, The
Case for Fair Use in New Zealand, 24 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 176 (2016).
78
See, e.g., May v. Sony Music Entertainment, 399 F.Supp.3d 169, 187-92 (S.D.
N.Y. 2019)(denying recording industry and other defendants’ motion to dismiss
based on fair use defense); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602
F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D. N.Y. 2009)(holding that song that Fox broadcasted in episode of Family Guy was fair use parody); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268
77
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An early example involved the negotiations leading up to the
landmark Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), adopted as part of the agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994. TRIPs requires
WTO member countries to comply with prescribed standards for intellectual property protection and authorizes the imposition of trade
sanctions against countries that fail to do so. In its initial submission
to the TRIPS negotiations, the United States delegation, working
closely with copyright industry associations, proposed that TRIPS
allow countries to provide for exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights only in “clearly and carefully defined special cases
which do not impair an actual or potential market for or the value of
a protected work.”79 If the U.S. proposal had been adopted, TRIPS
would have imposed a significant barrier to the adoption of fair use
in other countries. Under that proposal, indeed, Section 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act, might have itself run afoul of U.S. obligations
under TRIPS.
The U.S. proposal was profoundly antagonistic to fair use in two
respects. First, the proposal would have limited copyright exceptions to “clearly and carefully defined special cases.” That language
suggests that only specific, narrow statutory exceptions are permitted, or, at the very least, that judicial applications of an open-ended
exception would be vulnerable to the claim that the court failed sufficiently to define and delimit the special case held to enjoy the fair
use privilege.
Second, the U.S. proposal would narrowed the permissible
scope of copyright exceptions to those that satisfy the fourth fair use
factor: “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.” The proposal would have made the ab-

F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding, in favor of publisher defendant, that novel
Wind Done Gone was fair use adaptation of Gone with the Wind).
79
Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication from the United States, Article 6, GATT Doc. No.
MTN.GNG/GN11/W/70 (11 May 1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100144.pdf. On the “capture” of the United States Trade Representative by copyright industry interests to promote their domestic and
international agenda, see Margo E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977
(2014); Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique,
in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., Edward Elgar, 2007).
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sence of market harm a threshold requirement for uses to be permitted, not just one factor for courts to weigh in determining on a caseby-case basis whether a defendant’s use qualifies as fair use.
Granted, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the leading Supreme
Court ruling on fair use when the U.S. submitted its TRIPS proposal,
had characterized the fourth factor as the most single important factor for courts to consider. But even Harper & Row had not held up
the fourth factor as a threshold requirement. Moreover, in its 1994
ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court reiterated that
all four factors must be considered, and put considerable, if not primary, weight on the first factor, in particular on whether the defendant’s use is transformative.
Ultimately, the U.S. proposal was rejected. Instead, TRIPS incorporates the three step test that has now become a standard provision in multilateral intellectual property law treaties as well as in
national and regional legislation such as the EU Copyright in the
Information Society Directive. TRIPS Article 13 provides that WTO
member states “shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”
Some commentators have argued that the U.S. fair use privilege
might exceed the permissible scope of copyright exceptions under
the TRIPS Article 13 three-step test. They advance a number of arguments, principally that fair use’s open-ended, flexible character –
the fact that fair use enables courts to hold that new uses, involving
new technologies, not specified in the statute do not infringe copyright -- violates Article 13’s requirement that copyright exceptions
may be available only in “certain special cases.”80 In particular, they
80

See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATION AND THE THREE-STEP TEST
162-165 (Kluwer Law International 2004)(summarizing the views of European
commentators Herman Cohen Jehoram and J. Bornkamm). See also MIHALY J.
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO
COPYRIGHT TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (Oxford
2002) § 5.5 at 284; Herman Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and Their
Abuse, 27 E.I.P.R. 359, 362 (2005); Andre Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 32 E.I.P.R. 277, 278-279 (2010); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 75,
117 (2000); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 482 (Kluwer 1987). Okediji,
Fiscor, and Ricketson have since changed their position, contending that fair use
does comport with the three-step test. See Mihaly J. Ficsor, Conflict of the Canadian Legislation and Case Law on Fair Dealing for Educational Purposes with the
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argue that the “certain special cases” restriction implies that a copyright exception must be legislatively confined to a narrow and specific purpose, much like the United States’ rejected TRIPS proposal
would have explicitly required.81 Other commentators contest that
proposition. They view Article 13 as more open-ended and flexible.82 Or they contend that fair use as actually applied by U.S. courts
meets the three-step test and that actual application is what matters.83
During a review of nations’ copyright laws undertaken by the
TRIPS Council in 1996, the European Communities asked the
United States to “explain how the fair use doctrine, as it has been
broadly applied and interpreted by US courts, particularly in connection with a ‘parody’ that diminishes the value of a work, is consistent with TRIPS Article 13.”84 The United States responded that
“[t]he fair use doctrine of US copyright law embodies essentially the
same goals as Article 13 of TRIPS, and is applied and interpreted in
a way entirely congruent with the standards set forth in that Article.”85 In its response, the United States further emphasized that fair
International Norms (March 18, 2018) 14, <http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=77> (U.S. fair use is consistent with three-step test); P. Bernt
Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Final Report: Conceiving an International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright (Mar. 2008) 3,
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/copyright_20080506.pdf> (“The [three-step] test most likely permits both discrete European-style limitations and broader fair-use-style exemptions, or possibly a
combination of both.”); Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, SCCR 9/7
(April
5,
2003)
67-69,
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf> (some fair uses are consistent with the test). In citing these commentators and their changing views, we draw on Pamela Samuelson
and Kathryn Hashimoto, Is the U.S. Fair Use Doctrine Compatible with Berne
and TRIPS Obligations?, in PLURALISM OR UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW, Tatiana Eleni Synodinou ed., (Kluwer Law International 2019).
81
See, e.g., SENFTLEBEN, id., at 162-65 (summarizing the views of European commentators Herman Cohen Jehoram and J. Bornkamm).
82
See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, Martin Senftleben, The ThreeStep Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law,
29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581, 612-616 (2014); Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra
note 76 at 17.
83
See, e.g., Samuelson and Hashimoto, supra note 80, at xx.
84
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights: United States, WTO Doc.
IP/Q/USA/1 (Oct. 30, 1996) 4. The European Communities’ query and the U.S.
response is quoted in full in WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE, § 8:15.
85
Id.
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use is bounded by case law. The response cites the Supreme Court’s
statement in Harper & Row that the fourth factor is the most important. The U.S. response further declares that “[i]n applying the
fair use doctrine, the courts have consistently refused to excuse uses
that go too far and interfere with the copyright owner’s normal markets for the work.”86
In opposing adoption of fair use outside the United States, U.S.
copyright industries similarly take the position that U.S. courts have,
in fact, interpreted and applied Section 107 in a manner that generally comports with the three-step test. In so doing, they downplay
the breadth, flexibility, and importance of fair use in the United
States. In their telling, U.S. fair use comports with the three-step test
only because U.S. courts have narrowly interpreted the exception.
And they argue that, unmoored from restrictive and precise U.S.
precedent, courts in other countries might well interpret fair use in
an overly capacious, liberal manner that would exceed the strictures
of the three-step test.
We can see a prime example in the 2011 U.S. copyright industry
submissions to the UK’s state-commissioned Hargreaves Review of
Intellectual Property and Growth, which had solicited views on
whether the UK should adopt fair use and on whether fair use spurs
technological innovation and growth.87 In its submission, the Directors Guild of America (“DGA”) stated that “the fair use doctrine
provides only a narrow affirmative defense to copyright infringement, and applies most frequently to small samples of creative work
used for commentary, education, and parody.”88 The DGA further
stated: “The fair use doctrine does not explicitly account for technological innovation, and the purpose of the fair use doctrine is not to
promote any particular type of technological innovation.”89 Similarly, the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) informed the Hargreaves Review that because the U.S. Copyright Act
contains 15 specific and narrow exceptions to copyright in addition
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Id.
HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3.
88
COMMENTS OF THE DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA SUBMISSION
TO UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
COPYRIGHT AND GROWTH, March 3, 2011, at 4-5, http://www.dga.org/Initiatives/~/media/Files/Internet%20Theft/Directors%20Guild%20of%20America%20Submissionto%20the%20UK%20Independent%20Review%20of%20IP
%20and%20CopyrightMarch%2032011.pdf.
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to fair use, “this ostensibly ‘flexible’ system is actually a fact-intensive, detailed code.”90 The MPAA further cited U.S. Copyright Office advice that because the fair use defense is uncertain, “[t]he
safest course is always to get permission from the copyright owner
before using copyrighted material.”91
Of note, in these 2011 submissions, the copyright industries assiduously ignored U.S. court rulings that had already taken a considerably more expansive view of fair use. Most prominently, in its
1984 ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the
Supreme Court held that consumer recording of television programs
for later viewing is fair use and that, given that substantial noninfringing use, the supplier of consumer video-recording equipment
faces no liability for fostering copyright infringement.92 In so holding, the Court reiterated that “[t]he sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly… lie
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”93 Thus, the Court continued, “[w]hen technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be
construed in light of this basic purpose.”94
Subsequently, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit held that Google’s display of thumbnails of copyrighted images on its image search engine
is fair use.95 In so holding, the Court gave considerable weight to the
fact that “search engines such as Google Image Search provide great
value to the public.” It reasoned that fair use must be interpreted in
line with the Supreme Court’s statement in Sony that “[t]he purpose
of copyright law is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,’ and to serve “the welfare of the public.”96 And the Ninth Circuit further relied on Sony in noting “the importance of analyzing
fair use flexibly in light of new circumstances.”97
90

Comments of the Motion Picture Association, United Kingdom Independent
Review Intellectual Property and Growth (Mar. 4, 2011), at 11. The MPAA has
recently rebranded itself as the MPA, eliminating the “of America” phrase to emphasize the film industry’s global character.
91
Id.
92
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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464 U.S. at 429.
94
464 U.S. at 432.
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Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
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508 F.3d at 1163 (citing and quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n. 10 (1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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508 F.3d at 1166 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984).

28

DRAFT

2020

As a final notable example, in 2006 the Second Circuit held that
the market for transformative uses does not count for purposes of
determining market harm under the fourth fair use factor.98 When
the defendant’s “use of the copyrighted images is transformatively
different from their original expressive purpose,” the Court stated,
“a copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use
markets merely ‘by developing or licensing a market for parody,
news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own
creative work.’”99
Since 2011, U.S. courts’ extension of fair use to new technological uses and to uses held to be transformative has continued apace.
The U.S. copyright industries, however, persist in holding up their
imagined narrowly delimited portrait of fair use as the metric with
which to measure whether fair use should be adopted in other countries. They declare that they, of course, celebrate U.S. fair use. But
they insist that to adopt fair use elsewhere raises “serious questions
regarding consistency with the three-step test” because courts in
other countries lack the “many decades of [U.S.] case law and precedent” to insure that the fair use provision “is compliant with the
three-step test.” Indeed, in the case of civil law countries, they further argue, courts do “not follow the legal principle of stare decisis”
and are not “bound by judicial precedent in the same way as common law countries.”100
As such, the IIPA has repeatedly cited countries’ adoption of fair
use in support of its petitions to the USTR for placing such countries
on the watch list of countries that provide inadequate protection of
U.S. intellectual property rights and thus should face the threat of
trade sanctions.101 For example, the IIPA opposed Ecuador’s addi-
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Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2 nd Cir. 2006)
448 F.3d at 614-15.
100
International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2019 Report 141-42 (opposing
adoption of fair use in Ecuador). The International Intellectual Property Alliance
(“IIPA”) is an umbrella trade association representing the Association of American Publishers; Entertainment Software Association; Independent Film & Television Alliance; Motion Picture Association of America; and Recording Industry
Association of America.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, authorizes the President to take all appropriate action, including retaliation, against foreign government practices that burden U.S.
commerce. Pursuant to provisions referred to as “Special Section 301,” the U.S.
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tion of a fair use clause modeled on that of the United States. It argued that Ecuador’s adoption of fair use will “undermine copyright
protection” given that Ecuador is a civil law system and Ecuadorian
judges “have no experience or training on the doctrine of fair
use.”102 Similarly, the IIPA has recently petitioned the USTR to
deny South Africa developing country trade preferences due that
country’s alleged failure to provide “’adequate and effective’ protection of American copyrighted works.”103 The IIPA petition points
to South Africa’s “ill-considered importation of the U.S. ‘fair use’
rubric,” arguing that “South Africa lacks the decades of legal precedent that have served to define, refine, and qualify the fair use doctrine in the United States.”104 The IIPA has also objected to the

the U.S. Trade Representative for the Representative to consider as part of its annual review and determination of whether action is required to counter purportedly inadequate protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property in
foreign countries. Every year, the USTR places some countries in one of three
categories: “priority county,” “priority watch list,” or “watch list,” in descending
order of the extent to which that country has failed to provide adequate intellectual
property protection and enforcement, See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 7 PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 23.51-23.53 (March 2020 update)(discussing Generalized System
of Preferences and “Special Section 301”); Judith H. Bellow and Alan F. Holmer,
“Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 259 (1989-1990) (describing Special Section 301 objective
and requirements); Kaminski, supra note 79, at 988-1005 (describing the copyright industry’s extraordinary influence over USTR decision making in the Special Section 301 process and trade negotiations). The IIPA played an instrumental
role in lobbying Congress to add the Special Section 301 procedure to the Trade
Act. See PETER DRAHOS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 89-92 (New Press 2003).
102
International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA’S 2018 Special 301 Report
on Copyright Protection and Enforcement, Submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative, Feb. 8, 2018, at 125-26.
103
International Intellectual Property Alliance GSP Petition - South Africa, April
18, 2019, at 1. https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2019-00200002 [hereinafter IIPA Petition].The Trade Act of 1974 enables the President to
accord favorable trade benefits to developing countries under the rubric of the
“Generalized System of Preferences” (“GSP”) and provides that the President is
to consider, inter alia, whether a country provides “adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights” in determining that country’s eligibility for
such developing country benefits. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5).
104
IIPA Petition, id. at 7 and Appendix-South Africa: International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA) 2019 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and
Enforcement, Feb. 7, 2019, at 70-71.
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adoption, or proposed adoption, of fair use in Canada,105 Japan,106
South Korea,107 Chile,108 Taiwan,109 Sri Lanka,110 and, as we shall
see, Israel on similar grounds. In a number of instances, the IIPA
has insisted that countries that do adopt fair use must cabin the doctrine by providing explicitly in their copyright statute that fair use is
subject to the three-step test.111
U.S. copyright industries have likewise opposed the proposed
introduction of fair use in Australia and the E.U. In Australia, a common law country, a number of government studies, conducted between 2006 and 2018, favored adopting fair use. The Motion Picture
Association of America (“MPAA”) and the American Association
of Publishers (“AAP”) repeatedly filed submissions opposing those
proposals. For example, in its 2012 submission to the Australian
Law Reform Commission on Copyright and the Digital Economy,
the MPAA stated: “The enactment as part of Australian law of a new
105

International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2015 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement, Submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative,
Feb. 6, 2015, at 85-86 (objecting to Canadian Supreme Court’s adoption and application of open-ended exception modeled on fair use)
106
International Intellectual Property Alliance, Copyright Protection and Enforcement Around the World; IIPA’S 2009 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection
and Enforcement, Submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative, Feb. 17, 2009, at
283 (opposing proposal to adopt fair use in Japan given that “it would be extremely difficult to integrate this common-law doctrine into a civil law copyright
system such as Japan’s”).
107
International Intellectual Property Alliance, Copyright Protection and Enforcement Around the World; IIPA’S 2009 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection
and Enforcement, Submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative, Feb. 17, 2009, at
295 n. 14 (expressing grave concern about proposal to adopt fair use in South
Korea given that “Korea is a civil system which generally lacks the precedential
background against which the U.S. fair use exception has developed”)
108
IIPA’S 2007 Special 301 Report, Submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative,
Feb. 12, 2007, at 20 (opposing adoption of “’fair use’-like” exceptions in Chile).
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IIPA 2020 Special 301 Report, at 95 (opposing a draft amendment to Taiwan’s
copyright statute that would create a “catch-all” fair exception and insisting that
all exceptions “should be expressly confined to the three-step test”).
110
IIPA 2003 Special 301 Report at 594 (calling on Sri Lanka to narrow its copyright exceptions and limitations, including fair use, to make clear that they comport with the three-step test).
111
In its 2019 submission to the USTR, the IIPA maintains that “[s]ome copyright
‘reformers’ call for broadly drawn exceptions to copyright protection that threaten
to violate the cardinal global rule that such exceptions and limitations be confined
to those that meet the familiar ‘three-step test.’” It then cites the adoption of fair
use by Ecuador, South Africa, and Canada as examples. See IIPA, 2019 Special
301 Report, General Statement, p. vi.
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system based on the fair use doctrine would not bring with it this
century and a half of judicial precedent [in the U.S.] that allows
counsel, and the companies and individuals they advise, to rely upon
the doctrine. Indeed, at its introduction, the new system would be
unsupported by any binding precedent at all.”112 Likewise, the
AAP’s 2016 response to the Australian Government Productivity
Commission’s draft report advocating adoption of fair use highlights
fair use’s case specific uncertainty: “[T]he radical uncertainty of the
scope or applicability of the fair use exception to any particular set
of facts can be a debilitating cost…. In the United States, these costs
are mitigated, principally by the existence of a deep and rich body
of case law and precedent …. While this system works well in the
United States, AAP is skeptical whether it can be successfully transplanted to Australia.”113
For its part, in 2013, the European Commission solicited public
comments on whether the E.U. should provide for greater flexibility
for copyright exceptions and limitations, including in the form of a
fair use provision. The Motion Picture Association, Sony ATV Music Publishing, and NBC Universal all responded by adamantly opposing adoption of fair use in the E.U.114 They insisted that absent
U.S. case law’s many decades of judicial interpretation, transplanting fair use to the E.U. “would be unwise and inevitably bring chaos
to the system.”115
Finally, at copyright industries’ urging, the United States opposed any reference to fair use in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled. The Marrakesh Treaty,
which was adopted in June 2013 and came into force in September
112

MPAA, Submission 197 in ALRC Report, Letter by Greg Frazier, Executive
Vice President of MPAA, INC, to the Executive Director of the Australian law
Reform Commission 7 (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/copyright-and-digital-economy/submissions-received-alrc#org.
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AAP, Submission DR338. Submission by M. Luisa Simpson, Executive Director of International Enforcement & Trade Policy, to Productivity Commission
3-7 (June 2, 2016).
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Motion Picture Association, Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules; Submission to European Commission 5 (March 5, 2014); Sony/ATV
Music Publishing, Response to the Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules. Submission to European Commission 27-29 (March 5, 2014);
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NBCUniversal, Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules.
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2016, requires signatory countries to provide copyright limitations
or exceptions to facilitate the availability of copyrighted works in
accessible format to blind, visually impaired and print disabled persons (referred to in the Treaty as “beneficiary persons”).116 The
Treaty further provides that signatory countries may fulfill their
Treaty obligations through copyright limitations or exceptions that
“may include judicial, administrative or regulatory determinations
for the benefit of beneficiary persons as to fair practices, dealings or
uses.”117
While the draft Marrakesh Treaty was being negotiated, the Motion Picture Association sent U.S. negotiators a memorandum objecting that the draft treaty “expressly encouraged [signatory
countries] to implement the proposed instrument by way of fair use
or fair dealing, … without the need to pass by the three-step test in
each and every case.”118 The Motion Picture Association memorandum urged, accordingly, that “the proposed instrument should omit
a reference to specific ways of implementation, in particular fair use
and fair dealing, and subject all exceptions and limitations as a general rule to the three-step test.”119
A confidential U.S. State Department communication, subsequently obtained through a Freedom of Information Request, reveals
that government officials sought to assuage copyright industry objections to the draft Treaty’s reference to fair use. The communication, dated April 3, 2013, states: “I know [redacted name of person]
is interested in the reference to fair practices, uses and dealing on
page 18 of the draft document. Quite frankly, we think that this reference could lead to overly broad exceptions and, in the interests of
pragmatism, we think it would be best if we could drop this reference. I believe [redacted name of person] has lobbied you on this,
116

Marrakesh Treaty, Art. 4(1).
Marrakesh Treaty, Art. 10(3).
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Memorandum on WIPO VIP NEGOTIATIONS; Reference to fair use Incorporation of three-step test, dated April 4, 2013, sent via email attachment on April
15, 2013, by Scott Martin, Executive Vice· President, Intellectual Property, Paramount Pictures, to Shira Perlmutter, Chief Policy Officer and Director for International Affairs at United States Patent and Trademark Office, obtained from U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office in response to Freedom of Information Request by
James Love, Knowledge Ecology International. The reference to fair use was
added to the draft treaty text in November 2012, more than three years after the
treaty was formally proposed. Draft Text of an International Instrument/Treaty on
Limitations and Exceptions for Visually Impaired Persons/Persons with Print Disabilities, Document SCCR/25/2, 23 November 2012.
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no? Basically we think that removing this fair practices reference
will be a big help in getting consensus in the United States to negotiate the final parameters of a binding agreement in Marrakesh.”120
Ultimately, the reference to fair use remained in the Marrakesh
Treaty. At U.S. insistence, an Article was added requiring that, in
meeting their obligations under the Treaty, signatory countries must
ensure that their limitations or exceptions for beneficiary persons
comply with the three-step test set forth in TRIPS and other international treaties.121
In sum, U.S. copyright industries and, at certain junctures, U.S.
government agencies have resolutely opposed the adoption of fair
use in other countries.122 In so doing, they have assumed that, at the
hands of foreign courts, unhinged from the “deep and rich body of
[U.S.] case law and precedent,” fair use would likely be construed
so broadly, arbitrarily, and inconsistently so as to bring massive legal uncertainty and significant harm to copyright holders. The U.S.
copyright industry concern applies with special force to civil law
countries, which the industries insist lack the tradition of adherence
to precedent upon which common law fair use doctrine depends. But
the industries voice their concern with respect to common law countries as well. The U.S. copyright industries insist, accordingly, that
other countries should not replace narrowly defined, closed set limitations with fair use. And if other countries must adopt fair use, their
copyright statute must explicitly provide that fair use is subject to
120
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There are two notable exceptions. First, in July 2012, the United States Trade
Representative, against the avid opposition of the U.S. copyright industry, abruptly proposed language in the draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
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the three-step test, which the U.S. copyright industries interpret to
impose significant, necessary constraints on judicial discretion.
Commentators have presented convincing arguments challenging the U.S. copyright industry position. They question, first,
whether, in the face of dramatic changes in technology, closed list
copyright exception systems really yield more certain results than
fair use.123 They also contest the notion that civil law judges are illsuited to developing a relatively stable and certain fair use doctrine.124 Finally, commentators contend that, as properly interpreted,
the three-step test is not as constraining as the U.S. copyright industries imagine.125
We cannot further delve into those arguments in these pages.
Rather we present Israel’s adoption and application of fair use as a
case study that, at the very least, calls into question the copyright
industries’ blanket assertion that other countries’ adoption of fair
use doctrine will inevitably lead to chaotic uncertainty and license
for piracy, thus significantly undermining copyright holder rights.
III. ISRAEL’S ADOPTION OF FAIR USE
In broad brush strokes, the U.S. and Israel followed similar
paths to adopting fair use. In both countries, fair use was initially
formulated and developed in case law, and subsequently codified as
part of a general copyright statute revision. But in Israel, the Supreme Court adopted fair use within the framework of Israel’s precopyright revision fair dealing exception. That landmark ruling has
continued to influence fair use case law in Israel even after the Knesset replaced fair dealing with fair use.
This Part fleshes out key elements of Israel’s adoption of fair
See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright; Can the EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS, supra note 21, at 275, 282-83 (explaining why “the advantage of
legal certainty that is usually ascribed to the European system of precisely defined
exceptions should not be overstated”).
124
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125
See Hugenholtz & Seftleben, supra note 76 at 20-23 (arguing that the threestep test should properly be understood to give courts flexibility to interpret copyright exceptions and limitations liberally, thus effecting a balance between authors’ rights and the broader public interest in accommodating new technological
uses of existing expression); Hughes, supra note 21, at 242-48 (suggesting that
only specific judicial applications of §107, not §107 on its face, might violate the
three-step test of TRIPS, Article 13).
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use, focusing on two milestones: first, the judicial incorporation of
fair use into fair dealing, and second, the codification of fair use in
the Copyright Law 2007. With that backdrop, we also foreground
U.S. opposition to the Knesset’s replacement of fair dealing with
fair use. The next Part presents our empirical findings regarding the
first decade of case law following the effective date of fair use’s
codification in the Copyright Act 2007.
A. Courts: Melding together Fair Dealing and Fair Use
Israel’s Copyright Law 2007 replaced the U.K. Copyright Act
of 1911, which applied to British Mandate Palestine,126 and remained in force after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
As noted above, in the Copyright Act of 1911, the U.K. Parliament
codified the fair dealing defense to copyright infringement. Section
2(1)(i) of the Act provided that “any fair dealing with any work for
the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary” did not constitute copyright infringement.127
The Israeli Supreme Court’s landmark 1993 ruling in Geva v.
Walt Disney Co. concerned Disney’s claim that Dudu Geva, a renowned Israeli caricaturist, had infringed Disney’s copyright in its
cartoon character Donald Duck.128 Geva had authored a cartoon
book that included a story centered on Geva’s cartoon character
Moby Duck. Moby Duck looked nearly identical to Donald Duck,
but Moby sported an iconic Israeli hat often worn by Kibbutz members in the fifties and sixties. Geva’s story highlighted the subsequent decline of the Kibbutz movement. Geva argued that his
adaptation of Donald Duck in that context was protected free speech
and a parody, which was permitted under the Copyright Act of
1911’s fair dealing exception.
The Supreme Court, which issued its ruling just two months

See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 37(2)(a) (Eng.); see also Copyright Ordinance, CURRENT LAW 389. The Copyright Ordinance was amended
several times by the Knesset. See id. The transitional provisions of the 2007 Law
provide that the Copyright Act of 1911, 3 Annotated Laws of Palestine 2475, and
the Copyright Ordinance of 1924 continue to apply to certain matters. See 2007
Copyright Law § 78.
127
Copyright Act 1911, §2(1)(i) (U.K.)
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prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal fair use ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., discussed pre-Campbell case law and
commentary in considerable detail. In so doing, the Court drew a
sharp contrast between U.S. fair use doctrine’s flexible, open-ended
character versus the closed-list UK fair dealing exception then in
force in Israel. The Court expressed a clear normative preference for
U.S. fair use. As the Court stated: “[T]he American arrangement is
much more advanced and is, when compared to the 1911 law, a more
desired arrangement. … It seems that the American legislator preferred to create a flexible arrangement, one that enables maximal
consideration in the circumstances of each and every case.”
While the Court ultimately held that it was bound to apply the
fair dealing exception in the Israeli statute, it ruled that the each of
the enumerated uses was to be broadly interpreted given that the fair
dealing exception must reflect a balance between the rights of the
copyright owner and other public and social interests.129 In that regard, the Court broadly interpreted the fair dealing category of “criticism.” It held that “criticism” may include not only parody (i.e.,
targeting the copyright owner’s work for ridicule) but also satire
(i.e., using a work to target some person, artistic genre, or social
phenomenon other than the copyright owner’s work).130
However, the Court further held that not every use for purposes
of criticism constitutes fair dealing. To qualify as fair dealing, the
Court held, it is not enough that the use falls within one of the enumerated types of uses in the statute – what the Court termed the
“purpose of the use test.” The use, rather, must also satisfy a second
requirement, that of “fairness of the use.” And the Court adopted
the four-factor analysis of U.S. fair use law, as codified in Section
107 of the Copyright Act, to determine fairness.131
In applying the “purpose and character” of use under the first
factor, the Court considered whether the use was commercial, and
also whether it has promoted a new purpose, different from that of
129
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the original work.132 The Court emphasized that satires and other
socially beneficial uses may sometimes qualify as fair use even if
they are commercial. But the Court was not convinced that Geva’s
literal copying of Disney’s entire work truly served any satirical effect.133 After considering all four factors, the Court held that Geva’s
use had failed to meet the test of fairness. It accordingly rejected
Geva’s fair dealing defense.134
In sum, in Geva, the Israeli Supreme Court applied U.S. fair
use doctrine within the framework of the English fair dealing provisions, thereby creating a two-pronged test. Under Geva, Israeli
courts considering fair dealing defenses had to determine, first,
whether the purpose of the defendant’s use fell under any of the purposes explicitly enumerated by the U.K. law, and second, whether
the use met the test of fairness of use based on the four factors of
U.S. fair use doctrine. A use could qualify as fair dealing only when
both tests were met. Following Geva, the hybrid doctrine of fair
dealing/fair use remained the dominant approach in Israel until fair
dealing was finally replaced by fair use in the Copyright Act 2007.
B. Copyright Reform: From Fair Dealing to Fair Use
The Knesset enacted fair use in Section 19 of the Copyright
Law 2007 as part of a major copyright reform.135 As in the U.S.
Copyright Act, the fair use exception stands alongside and independently from specific exceptions and limitations for particular
uses, including the making of certain copies by public libraries and
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Id, at 276.
Id., at 283.
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The Court’s rejection of Geva’s fair use claim has been sharply criticized by
later commentators. See, e.g., Birnhack, supra note 29, at 275 (concluding that
“[t]he Court did not recognize the transformative nature of the use and over-emphasized the (minor) commercial aspect”).
135
. See Copyright Law (2007). The Act was passed by the Israeli Parliament (the
Knesset) on November 19, 2007, and came into force on May 25, 2008. See also
id. § 77. However, pursuant to the Law’s transitional provisions, an unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work that takes place prior to May 25, 2008 and that qualifies
as fair use will not be deemed infringing. See id. § 78(c); See also TAMIR AFORI,
COPYRIGHT ACT 540 (2012) (Hebrew).
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archives;136 public performances in educational institutions;137and
making certain transient and incidental copies.138
The fair use provision under the Israeli Copyright Law 2007
is very similar, but not identical, to the U.S. provision. Section 19
provides as follows:
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as:
private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic
reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination
by an educational institution.
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is fair
within the meaning of this section, the factors to be
considered shall include, inter alia, all of the following:
1) The purpose and character of the use;
2) The character of the work used;
3) The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the work as a whole;
4) The impact of the use on the value of the work
and its potential market.
(c) The Minister [of Justice] may make regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed a
fair use.
The Ministry of Justice explanatory notes accompanying the
proposed new copyright law stated that, despite Geva’s instruction
that the purposes enumerated in Copyright Law of 1911’s fair dealing provision must be liberally interpreted, the closed list provision
presented significant practical difficulties given the wide variety of
. Id. § 30-31. These sections exempt certain uses in libraries and archives of the
type prescribed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education, for the
purpose of preservation.
137
. Id. § 29.
138
. Id. § 26 (permitting transient and incidental copies made as an integral part of
communication conducted by an intermediary network and making transient copies when necessary to enable lawful use of the work, provided that the copy does
not have significant economic value in itself); §25 (permitting certain recording
of works for purposes of authorized broadcast); §24 (permitting certain copying
or making derivative works of a computer program); §23 (permitting certain
broadcast or copying of works in public place); §22 (permitting certain incidental
uses of works); §21 (permitting certain copying of works deposited for public inspection); §20 (permitting certain uses of works in legal or administrative proceedings); 28A (permitting certain copying and adaptation to facilitate access to
works for persons with disabilities).
136
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uses of creative expression that advance the fundamental purposes
of copyright law.139 Further, it would be extraordinarily difficult for
the legislature to set out a comprehensive closed list enumerating
such a wide variety of desirable uses, especially given the increasingly expansive reach of copyright holders’ rights under case law
and the proposed legislation. Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice
explained, subsection (a) of the proposed provision would provide
an open list of purposes that would enable courts to determine that
worthy uses are noninfringing “fair use” and thus to assist courts in
achieving balanced results in light of the expansion of copyright
holders’ rights.140
With respect to the four factors set out in subsection (b), the
Ministry of Justice noted, again citing Geva, that in interpreting
“fairness” under the fair dealing provision, Israeli courts had largely
adopted the arrangement set out in the U.S. statute.141 In that vein,
the Ministry explained – in language very much in line with U.S.
doctrine, courts are to consider the four factors, but may consider
other factors as well. Further, no single factor should be determinative. Rather, all the factors should be weighed against one another
to determine whether a use qualifies a fair use.
The Ministry of Justice also provided some explanation for
each statutory factor. Of note, Ministry states, along the lines of U.S.
fair use doctrine that the first factor is meant to distinguish between
commercial uses and not-for-profit uses for study and research.142
By contrast, the explanatory notes do not mention “transformative”
uses.143 However, in presenting the proposed copyright law revision
to the Knesset committee considering the legislation, the Ministry’s
lead representative explained that the fair use provision was intended to permit copying that has a clear public value, “which the
American literature has termed ‘transformative use.’”144 Finally, the
explanatory notes state that the fourth factor expresses, among other
139

Proposed Copyright Law 2005, Reshumot, Proposed Law 196, July 20, 2005,
at p. 1116, 1125 [hereinafter Proposed Copyright Law].
140
Id.
141
Id at 1126.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Knesset, Economic Committee, Meeting Minutes No. 128, 17th Knesset, Statement of Tamir Afori, Israeli Ministry of Justice, December 12, 2006, p 14 (Isr.),
available at https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Pages/AllCommitteeProtocols.aspx?ItemID=182266 [hereinafter Knesset Economic Committee
Minutes].
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things, Israel’s obligation to comply with the three-step test set out
in TRIPS Article 13.145
The Ministry of Justice’s lead representative also explained
that in proposing the fair use provision, the Ministry intended to
adopt the American model, including not just the language of Section 107, but also the case law regarding it. As such, the Ministry
opposed adding additional factors to Section 19(b) because that
might confuse Israeli courts into thinking that “we are different than
the United States.”146 Following that view, the Ministry’s lead representative later wrote, in a comprehensive treatise on Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, that the Knesset’s clear legislative intent in
enacting the fair use provision was, inter alia, to “direct the public
and the courts to the extensive fair use case law that had accumulated in the United States, and not to develop new rules in a vacuum.”147
Yet, despite their overall similarity, there are some important
differences between the Israeli and American fair use provisions.
First, the Israeli statute preserves the two-step structure of fair dealing. To qualify as fair use, a use must satisfy both of two independent requirements: the purpose test, codified in Section 19(a), and the
fairness test, codified in Section 19(b). In its recent ruling in Société
des Produits Nestle v. Espresso Club Ltd.148 the Supreme Court reiterated that the Section 19(a) is a prerequisite to fair use. If a use
does not fall within any of the enumerated purposes, or any purpose
of the same sort, it cannot be considered fair use and there is no need
to determine its fairness under Section 19(b). By contrast, under
U.S. fair use doctrine, courts consider the purpose of use under the
first factor. Accordingly, the purpose of use is weighed together with
the other factors as part of the overall fair use analysis.
Second, while Section 19(a) provides for an open-ended list
of purposes, in contrast with the closed list of fair dealing, it is not
quite as open ended as the introductory clause to Section 107. As
initially drafted, Section 19(a) provided that fair use is permitted,
“inter alia,” for the enumerated uses, meaning that, much like Sec-
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Proposed Copyright Law, supra note 139, at 1126.
Knesset Economic Committee Minutes, supra note 144, at 21 (authors’ translation from Hebrew original)
147
AFORI, supra note 135, at 208 (authors’ translation from Hebrew original).
148
C.A. 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestle v. Nespresso Club Ltd. (SC August
7, 2019).
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tion 107, the enumerated uses were meant entirely as illustrative examples. As enacted, however, Section 19(a) provides that fair use is
permitted for purposes “such as” the enumerated uses. In other
words, to qualify as fair use, a use must be for a purpose that has
some characteristic in common with those enumerated in Section
19(a).149 Some commentators conclude that virtually any use could
qualify has having such a purpose.150 But, at least in principle, Section 19(a) imposes some limit on the types of uses that can qualify
as fair use.
Third, Section 19(b) lacks an explicit reference to commercial use in the first factor. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act
provides that courts should consider “the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes.”151 By contrast, Section 19 of
Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, defines the first factor only as “the
purpose and character of the use”.152 Nonetheless, as indicated
above, the Ministry of Justice explanatory notes, like the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Geva, state that the use’s commercial nature is to
be considered in weighing the first factor, even if commercial nature
is not definitive. Hence, there would seem to be little or no practical
difference in effect between Israeli and U.S. fair use with regard to
commercial uses.
Finally, unlike Section 107, Section 19(c) of the Israeli fair
use provision authorizes a regulatory body, specifically the Minister
of Justice, to “issue regulations prescribing conditions under which
a use shall be deemed a fair use.”153 This provision aimed to reduce
the uncertainty resulting from the open ended nature of the fair use
doctrine. However, Israel’s Ministry of Justice has yet to issue any
such regulations.
C. U.S. Copyright Industry Opposition to Israel’s Enactment of
Fair Use

By contrast the U.S. Copyright provides explicitly that the term “such as” is
illustrative, not limitative. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
150
See, e.g., AFORI, supra note 136, at 199 (stating that it is difficult to conceive
of a purpose that would be so different than those enumerated such that it could
not meet the “such as” requirement).
151
17 USC §107
152
Copyright Law (2007), § 19(b)(1).
153. Id. § 19(c).
149
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The IIPA actively opposed Israel’s transition from fair dealing to fair use.154 The IIPA acknowledged that Israel’s proposed fair
use provision, including the four factors set out in Section 19(b),
closely tracked that of the United States. But as it has in other countries, the copyright industry trade association contrasted the newness
of the proposed fair use provision in Israel with the U.S., where
“many years of jurisprudence have provided … considerable clarity
on the boundaries of ‘fair use.’”155 Accordingly, the IIPA asserted:
There is a significant risk that in Israel adoption of
these factors at this time might be viewed by the
community as a free ticket to copy. This would have
disastrous consequences, and thus we urge the Israeli
government to re-examine the introduction of these
factors, rather than relying on Section 19(a), which
sets out the long-established “fair dealing” principle,
followed by specific exceptions dealing with certain
special cases.156
If Israel nevertheless replaced fair dealing with fair use, the
IIPA insisted, Section 19(b)(1) must be amended expressly to include the phrase “whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes.”157 The copyright industry trade
association was not content to rely on the Knesset Report and Israeli
case law for ensuring that a use’s commercial nature would weight
against a finding of fair use.
The IIPA also contended that “it is essential that the law implement the established Berne ‘three-part test’ (incorporated into
TRIPS)…. In other words, it should be codified in Section 18 that
no exception in Israel’s law (whether fair dealing, “fair use,” or a
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See Knesset Economic Committee Minutes, supra note 144, at 25 (Statement
of Tamir Afori, Ministry of Justice representative, confirming that the IIPA had
filed comments with Ministry opposing the transition from a closed list of permitted uses under fair dealing to an open list under fair use).
155
International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report Israel,
at
71
(2007),
available
at
http://www.iipawebsite.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301ISRAEL.pdf.
156
Id.
157
Id. Ironically, the phrase distinguishing commercial from non-profit educational uses was added to Section 107 to accord favorable fair use treatment to the
latter, at the insistence of educators who had unsuccessfully lobbied for a blanket
exception for all copying done for nonprofit educational purposes. See Samuelson, supra note 53, at 23-24.
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specific exception may be applied [in any way that does not meet
the three-step test].”158
Finally, subsequently to Israel’s enactment of fair use, the
IIPA expressed concern over Section 19(c)’s authorization of the
Ministry of Justice to issue regulations clarifying fair use. As the
IIPA stated: “Fair use is a case-by-case fact-based inquiry. This discretion seemingly without standard on the part of the Minister potentially opens the door for even broader exceptions to be introduced
in Israel. IIPA seeks clarification as to what the possible checks are
to this seemingly unlimited discretion.”159
The State of Israel responded to the copyright industry objections in a statement it submitted to the United States Trade Representative.160 It stressed the close similarity between the Israeli and
U.S. fair use provisions, proclaiming, indeed, that Section 19 is “virtually identical” to Section 107.161 With respect to copyright industry concerns about the absence of judicial precedent on fair use in
Israeli, the State of Israel provided assurance that Israeli case law
would draw upon that of the U.S.: “A body of case law interpretation
of section 19 will develop and no doubt American case law will provide persuasive precedent on this point, as American case law often
does in Israeli copyright law in general.”162
The State of Israel also highlighted the inconsistency in the
IIPA’s insistence that Israel’s copyright statute codify the three step
test. Its response asserts:
Neither Berne, nor TRIPS, requires that the exact
language of a treaty general principle be copied verbatim into national legislation. Indeed, if that were
the case then the IIPA would also have to claim that
Section 107 "Fair Use" of the U.S. Copyright Act is
in violation of Berne Article 9(2).163
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International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 155. at 70.
International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2009 Special 301 Report Israel, at
208 (2009).
160
2009 SUBMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE
2009 “SPECIAL 301 REVIEW”, March 2009, available at https://www.justice.gov.il/Units/YeutzVehakika/NosimMishpatim/Global/2009special301submission.pdf.
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Id. at 13.
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Finally, Israel deflected the IIPA objection to possible fair
use regulation by Israel’s Ministry of Justice: “To the extent that
regulations can be promulgated under the new section 19 with regard to specifying fair uses, such regulations are always subordinate
to the primary legislation and cannot contradict it.”164
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ISRAELI AND U.S. FAIR USE
CASE LAW
From the vantage point of over a decade since Israel’s enactment of fair use took effect, we can now begin to assess empirically
the U.S. copyright industry’s principal objections to Israel’s adoption of fair use. In this Part, we report the results of our comprehensive study of Israeli and U.S. fair use case law.
We reviewed all reported fair use rulings issued by Israeli
courts during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use provision, Section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, was in effect.
That period extends from May 19, 2008, to May 18, 2018. During
that decade, Israeli courts ruled on whether the defendant’s use qualifies as fair use in a total of 55 reported rulings. Of these, 34 rulings
were issued by Magistrate Courts, 18 by District Courts, and 3 by
the Supreme Court.165 Of the lower court rulings, one was upheld on
appeal and one was reversed.166 For ease of reference, we label this
study our “Israel Study.”
Throughout, we compare the results of our Israel Study with
empirical studies of U.S. fair use case law, including a parallel study
we conducted of U.S. fair use case law during the same ten-year
period as the Israel Study. That parallel study of U.S. fair use case
law includes 185 reported rulings, of which 157 were by district
courts, 28 were by appellate courts, and none were by the Supreme
Court. For ease of reference, we label our parallel study of U.S. fair
use case law, our “U.S. Study.”
We present our results in comparison with U.S. fair use case
law to provide a baseline for assessing whether the primary concern
164

Id.
Magistrate Courts are trial courts that have jurisdiction over civil claims for
less than 2.5 million shekels (the equivalent of roughly $725,000). District Courts
are both trial courts that have jurisdiction over larger claims and courts of appeal
for cases that originate in Magistrate Court. Appeals from District Courts are directly to the Supreme Court.
166
To better assess Israeli courts’ understandings of fair use, we count all rulings,
including the ruling that was reversed on appeal.
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raised by the U.S. copyright industries in opposition to Israel’s enactment of fair use has been realized in practice. Have Israeli courts
lacking familiarity with the “carefully-honed jurisprudence” of U.S.
fair use doctrine interpreted fair use in a loose manner that severely
undermines copyright protection in comparison with the experience
with fair use in the U.S.? In that regard, we also test Israel’s response
that U.S. copyright industry objections are fundamentally misguided
because Israeli courts will, no doubt, look to U.S. precedent to guide
their interpretation of Section 19, which, after all, is closely modelled on Section 107.
A. Methodology
Before we present the results of our studies, a caveat is in
order. Our studies look to the outcomes and express rationales that
courts present in reported judicial rulings. As such, they are subject
to the same limitations as commentators have detailed with respect
to similar empirical studies.167
Most importantly, while reported judicial rulings have great
importance for understanding fair use, they capture only the cases
that were of sufficient uncertainty of outcome and of sufficient monetary value that both parties saw fit to litigate through at least one
judicial ruling.168 Nor does a study of reported cases directly reflect
the myriad decisions related to copyright that are not related to litigation, including those that inform licensing and unilateral decisions
about when to copy or refrain from copying existing works.169
In addition, our empirical studies do not attempt to dive under the hood, to explore what unexpressed considerations, biases,
factors, and result oriented jurisprudence might actually be driving
judicial rulings on fair use. To attempt to do so would have introduced undue speculation, distortions, inconsistencies, and unreliability in scoring the rulings. As such, one might say that our studies
167

See Netanel, supra note 37, 731-34 (surveying the literature); see also Sag,
supra note 40, at 83.
168
The pioneer study of reported case selection biases is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal. Stud. 1 (1984).
See also Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get
Litigated?, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1265 (2002).
169
See Christopher A. Cotropia and James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An
Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2014).
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report what courts say they are doing, not necessarily what courts
are actually doing.
That said, however, our statistical analysis in the Israel Study
shows that various factors external to those that Israeli courts expressly identify in their fair use jurisprudence have no statistically
significant correlation with the finding of fair use. These include the
type of litigants (individuals, corporations, non-profits, or government agencies), types of works alleged to have been infringed (such
as photographs, audiovisual works, or literary works), and the types
of works created by the alleged infringers. We are thus reasonably
confident that our results do not reflect idiosyncrasies in the mix of
litigants or categories of works at issue during the period of our
study. Rather, the doctrinal factors that Israeli courts have cited as
part of their fair use analysis and that do have a statistically significant correlation with fair use outcomes appear to drive the courts’
fair use rulings and to form the foundations of Israel’s fair use doctrine during the period of our study.
B. Results
1. Case Outcomes on Fair Use
During the ten-year period of our study, Israeli courts were
significantly less likely than their U.S. counterparts to rule that a use
qualifies as fair use. Of the 55 rulings in our Israel Study, the court
determined that the allegedly infringing use failed to qualify as a fair
use in a substantial majority of the cases. The court rejected the alleged infringer’s fair use defense in 39 cases, just over 70% of the
total. The court ruled that the use was a fair use in just 16 cases,
slightly less than 30% of the total.
By contrast, a plurality of the 185 rulings in our U.S. Study
favored the alleged infringer on the issue of fair use. In the United
States, the court rejected fair use in 75 cases, or 40.5% of the total,
and ruled that the use was a fair use in 90 cases, or 48.6% of the
total. Of the remaining cases, the court ruled that further proceedings
were needed to determine outstanding questions of fact in 18 cases
(less than 10% of the total), and issued a mixed result, partly favoring the plaintiff and partly the defendant, in two cases.
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What could explain this dramatic difference in fair use outcomes? It might stem in part from variations in statutory language.
In particular, the Israeli provision retains something of fair dealing’s
two-part structure, providing that to qualify as fair use, a use must
satisfy both the purpose requirement and the fairness requirement.
We return to that possible explanation below.170
Another possible explanation is that, Israeli courts have
taken substantive positions on certain aspects of fair use that have
contributed to less friendly outcomes for the fair use defense than
under U.S. fair use doctrine, at least during the ten-year period of
our study. To shed light on that explanation, we reviewed each of
the 39 Israeli rulings that rejected fair use. Somewhat speculatively,
we assessed whether, in our considered judgment, the fair use defense might have been accepted if the same facts were before a U.S.
court. In our view, U.S. courts would have rejected fair use in the
vast majority of cases. Indeed, several Israeli cases involved fair use
claims that we regard as spurious. However, some nontrivial fraction of the cases in which the Israeli courts rejected fair use might
have resulted in a favorable ruling on fair use had the same case
come before a U.S. court applying U.S. copyright law. For example,
a number of Israeli rulings held that using iconic decades-old news
photographs to present historical documentation of significant
events in Israel’s history or to background news coverage on new

170
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developments did not qualify as fair use, largely because the defendant had failed to give authorship credit to the photographer.171 By
contrast, the use of photographs and graphic images as historical artifacts and documentation has generally (although not universally)
been held to be fair use in the U.S.172 Moreover, as discussed below,
the failure to give authorship credit is a non-issue in U.S. fair use
cases.173
At the same, it is possible that the sharp disparity in fair use
outcomes reflects some difference in litigation rules and practice between the two countries. Factors such as litigation costs, the availability and size of statutory damage awards, awards of attorney’s fees
and costs to prevailing parties, judicial power and propensity to dispose of cases and discrete issues in cases prior to trial, judicial encouragement of pretrial settlement, the ready availability of
copyright licensing (including through collective rights management organizations), and the presence of repeat players in the field
can impact the mix of copyright cases and case outcomes.174 The
171

See, e.g., Ephraim Sharir v. Teetell Arutzei Tikshoret (use of news photo as it
appeared in Lebanese press in story about Lebanese ridicule of Israeli leaders);
Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israeli Basketball Super League Administration Ltd (use of
news photo in League’s exhibition commemorating 60 years of Israeli basketball
history); Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israel News Corporation Ltd. (use of news photo
in documentary about significant events in Israel’s history).
172
The classic case is Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc. 293 F.Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), holding that copying the iconic Zapruder photographs of the
John F. Kennedy assassination to provide the public with information on that major historical event was fair use. See also Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737
F.3d 932, 944–45 (4th Cir. 2013) (National Football League’s copying of graphic
image of football team’s former logo in documentary video and football team’s
public display of former logo in exhibition featuring memorabilia from the team's
history are fair use); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d
605, 609-10 (2nd Cir. 2006) (use of concert poster art to illustrate a historical biography of rock band is fair use); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d
18, 22–23 (1st Cir.2000)(republication of photographs taken for a modeling portfolio in a newspaper was transformative because the photos served to inform, as
well as entertain); Philpot v. Media Research Center, 279 F.Supp.3d 708 (E.D.
Virg. 2018) (defendant’s use of plaintiff’s photographs of famous musicians to
accompany online articles about those musicians’ political views constitutes fair
use). But see Monge v. Maya Magazines 688 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012) (9th
Cir. 2012) (celebrity gossip magazine’s publication of previously unpublished
photographs of plaintiff’s clandestine wedding is not fair use).
173
See text accompanying notes – infra.
174
For example, the scholarly literature has shown that under certain conditions,
the English Rule, under which the losing party pays the winning party’s attorney’s
fees, engenders a mix of litigated cases having a higher possibility that plaintiffs
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possible extent, if any, of litigant selection effects arising from such
factors and their possible impact on fair use case outcomes are beyond the scope of our study.175
Finally, in comparing U.S. and Israeli courts acceptance of
the fair use defense, it is important to reiterate that fair use outcomes
in the United States have shifted over time. U.S. courts became far
more receptive to fair use defenses after the transformative use approach came to dominate fair use case law, roughly following the
Second Circuit’s embrace of the approach in the Grateful Dead concert posters case in 2006. In his study of fair use case law from 1978
through 2005, Barton Beebe found that defendants’ fair use win rate
for district rulings that were not reversed on appeal was only
32.1%.176 But as a later study showed, that fair use win rate rose
will prevail than under the American Rule, under which no attorney fee shifting
occurs. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 139, 140-42 (1984). However,
we doubt that result obtains in our study. Israel follows the English Rule, but, for
all intents and purposes, so does the U.S. in copyright cases, even if U.S. courts
have stopped short of formally adopting the English Rule. See Steven J. Horowitz,
Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 341 (2012) (noting
that attorney’s fees are awarded to prevailing copyright owners “as a matter of
course despite being nominally discretionary”); Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney's Fee Awards in Federal Copyright Litigation After Fogerty v.
Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often, But the New Standard Still
Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1381 (2000) (presenting empirical
study finding that U.S. courts granted motions for attorney’s fees to prevailing
copyright infringement plaintiffs in 89% of the cases and to prevailing copyright
infringement defendants in 61% of the cases).
175
We are also aware of the Priest-Klein hypothesis that outcomes in civil litigation should generally approximate 50% since parties will settle all but the most
uncertain cases. As Priest and Klein recognize, however, there are various exceptions to that hypothesis. See Netanel, supra note 40, at 753-53 (discussing PriestKlein hypothesis and its exceptions); see also Liu, supra note 44, at 167 n.19; John
R. Allison , Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness
and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 670-71 (2016). In particular, potential fair use
outcomes were probably subject to considerable uncertainty during the period of
our study, during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use provision was
in effect and during a longer period, extending back to the mid-1990s, in which
U.S. fair use doctrine was in flux.
176
Beebe’s data was limited to unreversed district court rulings on motions for
preliminary injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment.
He considered just crossed motions for summary judgment because courts are
generally more likely to publish an opinion granting summary judgment than
denying it. As a result, if cases where only one party moves for summary judgment are included, the results will be skewed by whether plaintiffs or defendants
file more such motions. Beebe, supra note 41, at 576-78.
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dramatically during the period 2006 through 2010 to 58.3%.177
Moreover, recent years have seen a possible retreat from U. S.
courts’ defendant-friendly approach to fair use. Our U.S. Study
showed a statistically significant turn away from accepting the fair
use defense during the last two years of our study, as U.S. courts
became less willing to find that the defendant’s use is transformative.178 From May 25, 2014 through May 24, 2016, U.S. courts ruled
that the use was fair use in 64.1% of the cases. But from May 25,
2016 through May 24, 2018, U.S. courts ruled that the use was fair
use in only 35.5% of the cases.179 Hence, while fair use win rates in
Israel were substantially lower than in the U.S. during full ten years
period of our study, win rates in Israel are much closer to those in
the U.S. during the last two years of our study and during the period
prior to U.S. courts’ decided embrace of the transformative use approach in 2006.
At bottom, while Israeli courts ruled against fair use at a
markedly higher rate than did U.S. courts during the period of our
study, we do not want to overstate the significance of that data point.
On one hand, it is, indeed, quite clear that Israel’s enactment of fair
use has not resulted in a “free ticket to copy” with “disastrous consequences” for copyright owners, U.S. copyright industry dire predictions notwithstanding. But the extent, if any, to which Israel’s
markedly less fair-use friendly outcomes truly reflects a significantly more restrictive substantive understanding of fair use among
Israeli courts than under U.S. fair use doctrine requires further study.
Moreover, to compare the two is, necessarily, to aim at a moving
target as U.S. and Israeli fair use doctrine evolve over time.
2. Influence of U.S. Precedent
Judicial citations to rulings of other courts are a commonly
used metric for the influence of those other courts. For example,

177

Netanel, supra note 40, at 755 (showing win rates for unreversed district court
rulings on motions for preliminary injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions
for summary judgment).
178
Our U.S. Study showed that courts found the defendant’s use to be transformative in 63% of the cases during the two-year period, May 25, 2015 through May
24, 2016, but in only 43% of the cases during the final two-year period of our
study.
179
The Pearson chi-square measure of statistical significance for the shift in fair
use outcome from the first of those two-year periods to the second is 0.041.
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Barton Beebe concluded, based on case citations, that fair use rulings from courts of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal
exerted an overwhelming influence on fair use rulings outside those
Circuits during the period of his empirical fair use case law study.180
Applying the metric of case citations to our study leads to
what, at first glance, is a startling result. Contrary to Israel’s assertion that Israeli courts would look to U.S. fair use precedent for guidance regarding how to interpret and apply Israel’s new fair use
provision, rulings of U.S. courts seem to have had virtually no direct
influence on Israeli fair use case law during the first ten years in
which Israel’s fair use statute was in effect. Only two Israeli fair use
rulings cited any U.S. fair use precedent at all. Both cases cited the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
Israeli courts made no mention of either of two other seminal U.S
Supreme Court rulings on fair use, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises. No less dramatically,
only two Israeli cases made any reference to Section 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act. Evidently, in the vast majority of cases, Israeli courts
saw no reason to cite the U.S. fair use provision from which Section
19 of the Copyright Act 2007 is derived.
Yet, despite the general dearth of case citations to U.S. fair
use precedent in our study, U.S. fair use doctrine clearly has influenced the crafting of fair use doctrine by Israeli courts. First, as discussed above, the Israeli Supreme Court first introduced fair use
doctrine into Israeli copyright law in Geva v. Disney, some 14 years
before the Knesset replaced Israel’s prior fair dealing exception with
fair use in the Copyright Act 2007. Geva did cite and rely on US
precedent, including Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios and several leading lower court rulings. Geva’s interpretation and application of U.S. fair use doctrine remains seminal precedent in Israeli
fair use case law. Thus, through Geva, U.S. fair use precedent has
indirectly impacted Israeli fair use case law even if Israeli courts do
not generally cite the U.S. cases.
Second, the two rulings in our Israel Study that do reference
U.S. precedents were Supreme Court cases. During the period of our
Israel Study, Israel’s Supreme Court addressed fair use in four rulings. In two out of the four, the Court made explicit reference to U.S.
fair use precedents. Football Association Premier League Ltd v
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Beebe, supra note 41, at 567-68.
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Anonymous181 involved a petition to unmask the identity of an anonymous user who streamed unauthorized broadcasts of football
matches owned by the English Premier League. Although the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court stated
that streaming constituted copyright infringement and that fair use
did not apply.182 The Court cited Campbell for the transformative
use approach, and also made extensive references to U.S. law review
articles. 183
In another decision, Safecom v Raviv,184 the Israeli Supreme
Court addressed the copied drawings of a functional electric device
in a patent application submitted to the USPTO. The Court explicitly
stated that “the four subordinate criteria listed in section 19(b) of the
New Law are based on the subordinate criteria that have been laid
down in the American Copyright Act [see: 17 USC § 107].” The
Court further cited empirical research on fair use in U.S. copyright
law, which demonstrated that “although the fourth subordinate criterion – the effect on the potential market – is most often mentioned
as the decisive factor regarding the fairness of use, the first subordinate criterion – the purpose and nature of the use – does in fact have
the most marked effect on the decision, the most influential factors
being the commerciality and transformativeness of the use.”185 Citing the decision in Football Association Premier League Ltd v
Anonymous, the Court held that these factors were also the most influential under Israeli law.186
Finally, in Nestle,187decided just after the ten-year period of
our study, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Campbell to hold
that the defendant’s parodic use was a transformative use and fair
use. The Court repeatedly cited other U.S. fair use precedent as well.

181. Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v.
Anonymous (2012). For a translation of the district court decision see CC (TA)
1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (Sept. 2, 2009) (Isr.),
http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-11.doc.
182. Id. at 2.
183
E.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessor, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982) in Premier League;
184
CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013), English translation
available
at
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Ltd.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf.
185
Id., pp. 19-20, citing Barton Beebe, supra note; Netanel, supra note 40.
186
Id., p. 19.
187
C.A. 3425/17 (August 7, 2019).

2019

53

At bottom, therefore, U.S. fair use precedent has probably influenced Israeli fair use jurisprudence to a considerably greater extent
than what might appear from overall case citations. Indeed, the
dearth of lower court citations to U.S. precedent might reflect the
economics of litigation more than a decided lack of interest in U.S.
precedent. Israeli courts will typically not look to foreign law unless
the parties cite it, and lawyers are unlikely to devote resources to
uncovering foreign law unless the case is of sufficiently high value
to warrant that investment.
3. Role of the Four Fair Use Factors in Fair Use Analysis
U.S. courts almost invariably apply each of the four statutory
fair use factors as part of their fair use analysis. Indeed, in Campbell,
the Supreme Court mandated consideration of all four factors. As
the Court stated: “Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in
isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”188
Israel’s fair use provision likewise states that courts must
consider all four of the factors. Section 19 provides: “In determining
whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning of this section the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia, all of the
following: [the four factors].” Nonetheless, in its 2012 ruling in
Football Association Premier League, the Israeli Supreme Court
held that “[t]hese are not necessary or accumulative factors, but a
non-exhaustive list of parameters that might indicate the fairness of
a particular use of the protected work.” 189
In line with the Supreme Court’s statement, and despite the
statutory requirement that “all” factors be weighed, Israeli courts
seem to view the four factors as suggested guidelines rather than a
checklist of items that must be expressly addressed in fair use analysis. Indeed, in almost 40% of the rulings in our Israel Study, the
court did not expressly apply any of the four fair use factors to the
facts of the case before it in determining whether the defendant’s
copying qualified as fair use.

188

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
189 Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v.
Anonymous (2012).
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Percentage of Israeli Rulings that Expressly Apply
Any of the Four Factors

Apply at least
one factor

38.2%

Apply no factors

61.8%

Further, while 51% of the Israeli rulings expressly apply the
first factor – the purpose and character of the use, significantly less
than half apply any of the other three factors. Only 20% apply factor
two – the character of the work used. Only 41.8% apply factor three
-- the scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to
the work as a whole. And only 32.7% of Israeli fair use rulings apply
factor four-- harm to the copyright holder’s market.
Percentage of Israeli Rulings that Expressly Apply Each Factor
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4. Weighing the Four Factors
In the cases in which Israeli courts do apply one or more of
the four statutory fair use factors, they, like their U.S. counterparts,
typically determine whether that factor weighs in favor of or against
fair use. In the instances in which Israeli courts determine that a statutory factor weighs for or against fair use, that determination lines
up almost universally with the fair use outcome in the case. For example, during the ten-year period of our Israel Study, Israeli courts
expressly found that the first factor weighed against fair use in
27.2% of the cases. They rejected the fair use defense in every one
of those cases. Israeli courts expressly found that the first factor
weighed in favor of fair use in 26.3% of the cases. They ruled that
the alleged infringer had made fair use of the plaintiff’s work in
every one of those cases. When Israeli courts expressly found that
factors two, three, or four either favored or disfavored fair use, that
finding also substantially lined up with the court’s ruling on fair use
overall, albeit by slightly less than a 100 percent correlation.
Notwithstanding the strong correlation between Israeli
courts’ findings on the statutory factors and fair use outcomes, only
factor one appears to have much valence in explaining fair use outcomes in Israel. Our Israel Study shows a statistically significant
correlation between an Israeli court’s determination on factor one
and the court’s ruling on the overall issue of fair use. 190 And, as
noted above, Israeli courts expressly applied the first factor in
slightly more than half the cases during the ten-year period of our
study. Of the other factors, only factor two has a statistically significant correlation with overall fair use outcomes. But since only 20%
of the cases even mention factor two, it is unlikely that judicial determinations of factor two have much effect on fair use outcomes
overall.191

The Fisher’s exact test measure of statistical significance for the correlation of
a judicial finding that factor one weighs against fair use with a fair use outcome
that rejects fair use is two-sided p<=0.0025. The Fisher’s exact test measure of
statistical significance for the correlation of a judicial finding that factor one favors fair use with a fair use outcome that finds fair use is two-sided p<=0.0001.
The Fisher exact test is used to measure statistical significance where the size of
the data sample is sufficiently small so that Chi-Square might not be a valid test.
191
We rely only on bivariate correlations because logistic regression analysis is
not suited to our study. See text accompanying note – infra.
190
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In the United States, factor one also has the strongest correlation with fair use outcome. However, unlike in Israel, the correlation between factor four and fair use outcome is statistically
significant as well.192 U.S. fair use jurisprudence also differs from
Israeli case law in which sub-factors of factor one are most strongly
correlated with fair use outcome and thus that seem to drive judicial
rulings on fair use. In the U.S., courts have identified three sub-factors pertaining to the purpose and the character of the defendant’s
use.193 These are whether (1) the use is transformative, (2) the use is
commercial, and (3) the defendant used the copyrighted work in
good faith. In the United States, transformative use appears to play
a significantly larger role in determining fair use outcomes than do
the other two sub-factors. Indeed, Liu’s study finds that when courts
found factor one to favor fair use, only transformative use was statistically significant among the sub-factors.194
In Israel, as further elucidated below, although the Supreme
Court twice referred to transformative use as part of the fair use analysis,195 the lower courts almost entirely ignored the concept of transformative use during the period of our study. Rather the factors of
(1) the commercial character of the allegedly infringing use and (2)
whether the defendant gave authorship credit to the creator of the
copied work, a factor that has hardly any role at all in U.S. fair use
jurisprudence, have the strongest correlation with fair use outcome.196 In our Israel Study, the defendant’s good or bad faith also
has a statistically significant correlation with fair use outcome when
measured in a bivariate analysis.
Of further note, although factor one now has the strongest
correlation with fair use outcomes in the United States, factor four
had the strongest correlation during the period before the transformative use approach came to dominate U.S. fair use case law. Indeed,
in his empirical study of fair use case law from 1978 to 2005, Barton
Beebe reported a near perfect correlation between judicial findings
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Liu, supra note 44, at 184-5, 198.
Id. at 185.
194
Id.
195
See Premier League; Safecom;
196
We refer to the commercial character of the use and whether the defendant
gave authorship credit as “factors” rather than “sub-factors” because Israeli courts
treat authorship credit and, sometimes, commercial character, as independent factors rather than subsuming them within the first statutory factor or any other statutory factor.
193
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on factor four and fair use outcomes.197 That result comported with
the U.S. Supreme Court dictum in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, characterizing the fourth factor "the single most important
element of fair use."198 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., decided in 1994, some nine years after Harper & Row, the Supreme
Court flatly contradicted the Harper & Row dictum, even if it did
not expressly overrule it. The Campbell Court underscored that
courts are to consider all four statutory factors, without any single
factor being the most important.199 Further, the first factor has now
eclipsed the fourth factor in importance and degree of correlation
with fair use outcomes. Nonetheless, lower courts in the U.S. continue to cite the Harper & Row dictum that the fourth factor is the
single most important. One-fourth of the rulings in our U.S. Study
cited the dictum.
Whatever the continuing force of the Harper & Row dictum
in the United States, it has had negligible influence in Israel. That is
not surprising. After all, less than one-third of the rulings in our Israel Study apply factor four and no Israeli ruling has cited Harper
& Row. Only one Israeli ruling in our data set stated that factor four
is the most important. Four rulings stated expressly that factor four
is not the most important and that all the factors should be considered equally. Forty-nine rulings, amounting to 89.1% the rulings in
our Israel Study, made no reference at all to the relative importance
of factor four.
Finally, in what may mark a departure from American fair
use jurisprudence, the Israeli Supreme Court in Nestle, has recently
put forth an original conceptual framework for the four factors analysis. Copyright law, the Court held, aims to encourage the creation
of works for the purpose of enriching the public domain:200 The purpose of fair use, is to limit copyright, to ensure that it is appropriately
balanced to achieve its goals, and to ensure it does not unduly constrain public access to works without justification.201
Within that framework, the Court classified the factors into
three broad considerations based on the theoretical foundation of
197

Beebe, supra note 41, at 617.
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, ----.
199
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994), stating that
"all [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of
the purposes of copyright."
200
Nestle, at 31.
201
Id., at p 32.
198
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copyright law. The Court characterized the four factors as tests to
assist the court in applying these considerations in particular circumstances. The first consideration explores the extent to which the allegedly infringing work promotes socially valuable objectives,
including that of encouraging creation. This consideration is reflected in factor one (the purpose and character of use) and factor
two (the nature of the protected work).202 The second consideration
is the extent by which the allegedly infringing use impairs the copyright holder’s incentives, by compromising his control over the use
of his work and its economic exploitation.203 This consideration is
reflected in factor four (effect on the value of work and its potential
market) and factor three (the scope of use).204 The third consideration is proportionality. It explores the extent to which the actual use
of the original work in the allegedly infringing copy, serves the general purpose of the allegedly infringing work. Factor three (the scope
of use) and factor one (the purpose and character of use) reflect this
consideration.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the four factors are
simply tests to assist the court in applying the three considerations,
the Court in Nestle nevertheless proceeded to carefully analyze each
of the factors. It remains to be seen whether this new conceptual
framework for the four factors will affect their relative weight in
determining fair use outcomes, and how this framework will affect
the overall analysis of fair use cases.
5. Transformative Use
Within the last two decades, the transformative use approach
has come completely to dominate U.S. fair use jurisprudence. As we
have noted, in his recent exhaustive empirical study of transformative use in U.S. copyright law from the Copyright Act of 1976
through 2016, Jiarui Liu reports that during the final decade of his
study nearly 90 percent of U.S. fair use rulings addressed whether
the allegedly infringing use is transformative.205 Liu’s study also
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Id., p. 34
Id.
204
The Court noted that there might be a tension between these two considerations, for instance, when a work promotes an important social goal but may cause
economic harm to the rights holder.
205
Liu, supra note 44, at 177.
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shows significant correlations between fair use outcomes and judicial findings regarding whether a use is transformative. Finally, as
Liu demonstrates, a finding that a use is transformative profoundly
impacts judicial analysis of fair use factors one, three, and four.206
Not surprisingly, our U.S. Study comports with Liu’s findings. During the period of our study, courts explicitly addressed
whether the defendant’s use was transformative in 82.7% of the
cases. Further, in an additional 14.2% of the cases, courts applied
the transformative use approach by expressly addressing the key
definition of what constitutes a “transformative use,” whether the
defendant’s expressive purpose differs from that of the plaintiff,
even if the court did not expressly use the word “transformative.”
Together, these amount to almost 97% of the cases in our U.S.
Study. And, notably, although courts during the final two years of
our U.S. Study were less likely to find the defendant’s use to qualify
as transformative than previously, they continued to consider
whether the use is transformative in almost every case.207
By comparison, the Israel Study demonstrates that the transformative use approach made a small dent in Israeli fair use case
law, but its influence remained marginal. Only eight Israeli rulings,
14.5% of the total, mentioned the word “transformative.” And, of
those, only six rulings, 10.9% of the total, expressly found whether
or not the allegedly infringing use in question was transformative.
Likewise, very few rulings considered or gave any weight to
whether the alleged infringer’s expressive purpose differed from
that of the author of the copied work. Only two cases found that the
alleged infringer had a different expressive purpose and that this fact
weighed in favor of fair use.
Nonetheless, in those few instances in which Israeli courts
did determine whether the use in question was transformative, the
findings correlated 100% with fair use outcomes.208 In all three of
the cases in which the court held that the use was transformative, it
ruled that the use was fair use. In all three in which the court held
that the use was not transformative, it ruled against fair use. Thus,
206

Liu, supra note 44, at 190 (factor two), 194-95 (factor three), and 198-99 (factor four).
207
See supra note _.
208
In line with that 100% correlation in those few cases in which Israeli courts
did rule on whether the use is transformative, there was a statistically significant
correlation overall between the Israeli courts’ finding on transformative use and
fair use outcomes (Fisher’s exact test two-sided p<=0.0284)-- even though almost
90% of the rulings did not even mention transformative use.
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at least within the very small set of cases in which Israeli courts did
determine whether the allegedly infringing use was transformative,
Israeli jurisprudence aligned with the transformative use approach
that dominates U.S. fair use doctrine. In both countries, a finding of
whether the defendant’s use is transformative heavily correlates
with fair use outcome.
In addition, Israel’s Supreme Court has been considerably
more receptive to U.S. transformative use doctrine than have its
lower courts. Out of the handful of cases in our Israel Study that
expressly addressed transformative use, two are Supreme Court rulings. Citing Campbell, the Supreme Court in Football Association
Premier League Ltd opined that it is easier to define a transformative use than a non-transformative use as “fair.”209 Transformative
uses, the Court continued, fulfill the purpose of the fair use exception, which is to promote creation and enrich the accumulation of
knowledge by society. Moreover, the Court noted, in many cases, a
transformative use neither substitutes for the protected work nor otherwise competes with it. As a result, transformative uses generally
cause no economic harm to authors’ incentives to create. Ultimately,
however, the Court rejected the defendant’s fair use claim. It held
that streaming an original broadcast “as is,” in a manner that serves
exactly the same purpose and aims to reach precisely the same audience as the original does not constitute a transformative use. 210
In Safecom v Raviv,211 the Supreme Court alluded to the importance of transformative use, citing American empirical studies.212 Yet, finding against fair use, the Court held that defendant’s
near exact copy of the plaintiff’s patent application drawings did not
qualify as transformative use. As the Court stated, “it does not appear that the Respondent's use of the Safecom drawings led to the
creation of a new expression, different from the original expression
embodied in them.”213
209 Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v.
Anonymous (2012). For an English translation of the district court decision see
CC (TA) 1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (Sept. 2,
2009) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-11.doc.
210
Id. The Israeli Supreme Court’s holding is consistent with prevailing U.S. fair
use doctrine. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when an original work is
merely retransmitted in a different medium.”)
211
CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013), English translation
available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/safecom-ltd-v-raviv.
212
Safecom, at 20 (citing Beebe, supra note 41, and Netanel, supra note 40).
213
Id.
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Finally, in its recent seminal decision in Nestle,214 the Israeli
Supreme Court fully embraced the transformative use approach that
currently dominates U.S. fair use case law. Nestle, the owner of the
successful global brand Nespresso, sued a local Israeli coffee company, Espresso Club, over Espresso Club’s TV commercial campaign mocking Nespresso’s original commercials featuring the
American star, George Clooney.
In a decision that is heavily based on U.S. judicial rulings
and law review articles, the Court found for the defendant, concluding that the mocking commercial amounts to fair use. The Court
highlighted the significance of transformative use, as a central test
of fair use considered by the courts in the US and in Israel.215 The
importance of the transformative test arises from its link to the purpose of copyright law: to enrich the public domain with creative
works. The public domain does not gain from mere copying a work
without any additional creativity, and it is therefore difficult to justify the harm such copying may cause to the incentives of the original author. However, when the defendant has used the original work
to create something different and new, the justification for allowing
the original author to prevent the distribution of the second work is
called into question. Citing Campbell, the Court stated that transformativeness involves an inquiry into the extent to which the defendant’s work is of a different character, or innovative compared to
the original work, and whether it has an additional tier or dimension.216
The use at issue in Nestle was a parody, a paradigmatic transformative use. It was a work of different character, which had a different essence and communicated a different message. It thus raises
the question whether uses, like Google Book Search’s mass digitization of books, that involve exact copying of the entire original
work for a fundamentally different, socially beneficial purpose
might qualify as a transformative use and a fair use.217 While Israeli
courts have yet to rule on technological uses like mass digitization,
lower courts have accepted fair use claims involving exact copying
214

C.A. 3425/17 (August 7, 2019).
Id. at 44. The Court cited Safecome and Premier League.
216
Id. at 43.
217
An Israeli copyright infringement action against Google regarding Google
Book Search met defeat when an Israeli district court ruled that the lawsuit was
ineligible for a class action, without reaching the issue of fair use, and the plaintiff
withdrew his appeal at the recommendation of the Supreme Court. CA 230/12
Jonathan Brauner v. Google Inc., September 11, 2013.
215

62

DRAFT

2020

for different purposes without making any express reference to
transformative use. Those uses have including copying a chorography for the purpose of learning,218 replication of portions of a copyrighted newspaper interview on a politician’s website,219 the posting
of a copyrighted photograph on a Facebook page of an NGO advocating animals’ rights,220 and the pulling of blog posts entries and
headlines by an online news website using RSS.221 In any event, it
remains to be seen whether subsequent Israeli cases will broadly apply the transformative use approach and, if so, whether that will
translate into more favorable fair use outcomes for defendants as it
has in the United States.
6. The Factors that Drive Israeli Fair Use
Our Israel Study identified four factors that had a statistically
significant correlation with fair use outcomes and that were applied
by courts in enough cases to provide a possible explanation for what
has driven Israeli fair use outcomes and doctrine. We note that given
the relatively small size of our data set and given that each of those
factors had a strong, independent statistically significant correlation
with fair use outcome, logistic regression analysis is not suited to
our study. We, accordingly, look to bivariate correlations and an assessment of the number of cases in which courts rule on the relevant
factor to determine the extent to which that factor might explain fair
use outcomes.
We also compare Israeli court treatment of these factors with
that of U.S. courts. In so doing, we identify a sharp distinction between Israeli and U.S. fair use doctrine during the ten-year period of
our study. With one exception, none of the factors that correlate significantly with fair use outcomes in Israel correlate significantly
with fair use outcomes in the United States. Indeed, the potentially
highly influential factors in Israel generally have a decided marginally impact on fair use outcomes and doctrine in the U.S.
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CC 8303/06 Mejula v. Hanan Cohen (District Court Jerusalem, 2008).
CC 57588-05-12 Danon PR Telecommunications v. Shelly Yachimovich (District Court Tel Aviv, 2012).
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CC 48263-11-13 Ronen v. Let the Animals Live ( Magistrate Court of Reishon
Letizion, 2016).
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a. Commercial Use

As discussed in Part III, the U.S. copyright industries who
lobbied against Israel’s adoption of fair use raised particular concern
that, as drafted, Israel’s fair use provision omits any express mention
of the commercial nature of the use and would thus encourage Israeli
courts to liberally award fair use to commercial uses of copyrightprotected works.
Ironically, however, our Israel Study reveals that, in fact,
Israeli courts appear to have weighed the commercial nature of the
use far more heavily against fair use than do their U.S. counterparts.
In our Israel Study, over 90% of the 23 rulings that found that the
allegedly infringing use was commercial proceeded to reject the fair
use defense.222 Conversely, in 6 out 7 cases (85.7%) in which the
court explicitly found that the use was not commercial, the court
ruled in favor of fair use, also a statistically significant correlation.223
By contrast, our U.S. Study further found that the court ruled
against the defendant on fair use in only half the cases in which the
court characterized the use as commercial. In the United States, a
judicial finding that the defendant’s use was commercial thus correlated with the court’s rejection of the defendant’s fair use defendants
with no higher odds than would be predicted from flipping a coin.
On the other hand, when courts characterized the use as non-commercial, they ruled, similarly to Israeli courts, that the use was fair
use in an overwhelming 83.9% of the cases.224 Finally, when U.S.
courts characterized the use as both commercial and transformative,
they ruled that the use was fair use in 80% of the cases and that the
use was not fair use in only 8.9% of the cases (with the remainder
either questions of fact or mixed).

222

A two-sided measure of statistical correlation between finding that use is commercial and fair use outcome is Chi-Square p=0.0048.
223
Per the Fisher’s exact test, the two-sided measure of statistical correlation between finding that use is not commercial and fair use outcome is two-sided p<=
0.0016.
224
All in all the correlation between commercial character and fair use outcome
was statistically significant, at Pearson Chi Square p = 0.005.
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Court Finds Fair Use when Use is Commercial
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The striking difference between Israel and the U.S. in fair
use outcomes when the court finds the use to be commercial is also
reflected in the respective courts’ express statements about the
weight to be accorded the commercial nature of the use in fair use
analysis. In our Israel Study, 47% of the rulings expressly stated that
the commercial nature of the use is to be weighed against fair use.225
Of these, seven rulings stated expressly that no commercial use may
qualify as fair use and 13 rulings stated that the commercial nature
of the use is an important, but not disqualifying, factor weighing
against fair use. Further, another six rulings expressly weighed the
commercial nature of the use heavily against fair use without specifying whether commercial nature disqualifies a use from being fair
use or merely weighs significantly against it..Only one ruling stated
that the commercial nature of the use is of marginal weight in determining fair use.
By contrast, our U.S. Study found that no court stated that a
commercial use may never be a fair use and only 11.3% of the rulings stated that commercial uses are generally presumed to be unfair
and/or to cause market harm. Further, in 37.8% of the rulings, U.S.
courts expressly minimized the importance of the commercial nature
225

Of those rulings, 48% defined commercial use as a use that is designed to reap
a profit and 36%, more broadly, a use designed to reap any benefit for the defendant, including enhancement to reputation. An additional 16% did not define commercial use. No Israeli court used the phraseology that appears in some U.S. fair
use cases to the effect that a commercial use in one in which the defendant fails
to pay the customary price for the use.
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of the use, such as by stating that if the use is transformative, the
commercial character weighs little against fair use.
Notably, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent ruling
in Nestle appears to signal a closer alignment of Israeli and U.S. fair
use on the issue of commercial use. In Nestle, the Court stated that
the Knesset’s omission of explicit reference to the commercial nature of the use in Section 19(b)(1) was meant to clarify that fair use
is not to be categorically denied to commercial uses.226 Rather, in
line with U.S. fair use doctrine, courts are to consider both the use’s
commercial nature and whether the use is transformative, but must
give less weight to the former than the latter.227 As with other aspects
of the Court’s ruling in Nestle, it remains to be seen how lower
courts will interpret and apply that clarification regarding commercial use.
b. Authorship attribution

The defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution appeared to weigh heavily against fair use in our Israel Study. Courts’
ruling on fair use defenses found that the defendant had failed to
give the author adequate credit in 22 cases, or 40% of the cases in
our data set. The court rejected the defendant’s fair use defense in
all but one of those cases.228
Some further explanation is in order. Israel’s Copyright Law
2007 recognizes authors’ moral right of attribution.229 The author’s
moral right of attribution, namely to have his name identified with
his work, is limited to “the extent and in the manner suitable in the
circumstances.”230 As in other countries, under Israeli law, the author’s moral right is a personal right that is distinct from the author’s
copyright.231 By the same token, fair use applies only to any unauthorized use of copyright owner’s economic rights, not the moral
right of attribution. Unlike some statutory fair dealing and fair use
226
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provisions in other countries, Section 19 does not explicitly require
authorship attribution as a condition to the fair use defense.232 Nonetheless, our Israel Study demonstrated that courts have repeatedly
considered the lack of attribution in determining fair use.
Authors brought a claim for infringement of their moral right
of attribution in addition to a claim of copyright infringement in
56.4% of the fair use cases in our Israel Study. The court ruled that
the defendant had infringed the author’s moral right of attribution
by failing to give the author adequate credit in 22 of those cases. As
just noted, the court rejected the fair use defense to the author’s copyright infringement claim in all but one of those 22 cases.
By contrast, the defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution is virtually a non-issue in the United States, where the Copyright Act contains no general recognition of authors’ moral right. In
our U.S. Study, only two rulings (1.1% of the total) stated that failure to give authorship attribution can weigh against fair use -- and
two rulings state the opposite, that failure to give credit to the author
is irrelevant. Nor does the fact that the defendant gave authorship
attribution generally weigh in favor of fair use. Only three rulings
(1.6%) in our U.S. Study stated that giving authorship attribution
can weigh in favor of fair use, and one expressly stated that that fact
that the defendant credited the author was irrelevant to fair use analysis.
A handful of U.S. fair use rulings prior to the 10-year period
of our study gave some weight to authorship attribution.233 But our
empirical study and careful reading of fair use doctrine reinforce our
conclusion that authorship attribution generally weighs little, if at
all, in U.S. fair use case law. As an earlier study concludes, despite
232
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courts’ occasional reference to authorship attribution as an equitable
consideration for fair use, it is “most certainly not the case” that “attribution is regularly considered by courts as a factor in the fair use
analysis.”234 Again, that stands in sharp contrast to the considerable
weight given to authorship attribution by Israeli courts.
Having said that, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Nestle might move Israeli fair use doctrine closer to
that of the U.S. along this vector as well. Nestle did not hold explicitly that failure to give authorship attribution is irrelevant to fair use.
But it repeatedly highlighted the distinction between an author’s
moral rights and the economic rights of the copyright owner, and
stated that an author’s recourse for violation of his or her moral
rights lies only in the moral rights provisions of the Copyright Law
2007, not in the copyright provisions.235 Further, the fact that the
Nespresso had failed to credit the author of the creative expression
that it copied was conspicuously absent from the Court’s fair use
analysis.236 The Court did not even mention the defendant’s failure
to give authorship attribution, let alone give it any weight.
c. The defendant’s purpose of use

As discussed above, Section 19 of the Israel Copyright Law
2007 sets out a two-part test for fair use. Section 19(a) provides:
“Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as private study,
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination by an educational institution.” In contrast
to Israel’s previous fair dealing exception, Section 19(a) is meant to
set out an open list of permissible purposes. Uses other than the enumerated uses may qualify as fair use. However, to qualify as fair use,
the defendant’s use must be “such as” one or more of the enumerated
uses in some way. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Nestle, Section 19 sets out two requirements for a finding of fair use: purpose
and fairness. The Court explicitly held that “the language of section
19(a) does not allow renouncing the purpose test as an independent
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preliminary test.”237 At the same time, as discussed above, Israeli
courts broadly interpreted the purpose test.238
In our Israel Study, 19 rulings (35.5% of the total) expressly
found that the defendant’s use was not one of the uses enumerated
in Section 19(a). In all but two of those 19 rulings, the court rejected
the defendant’s fair use defense, yielding a statistically significant
correlation between fair use outcome and a finding that the defendant’s use is not one of the enumerated uses.239 Notably, moreover,
none of those rulings analyzed whether the use in question was
“such as” one or more of the enumerated uses. This suggests that
Israeli courts might be continuing to apply the approach from the
previous fair dealing regime, in which only enumerated uses could
qualify for the fair dealing defense, rather than the more open (although not entirely open) regime set out in Section 19. In that vein,
only 18% of rulings explicitly acknowledged that the list of enumerated purposes is an open-ended list.
On the other hand, in 65% of the cases in our Israel Study
the court did not explicitly find that the use failed to satisfy the purpose test. In these cases, the court found the use to be for one of the
purposes enumerated by the clause, or simply ignored the purpose
test all together. In sum, it is not clear whether the 17 rulings that
denied fair use after finding that the defendant’s use was not one of
the enumerated purposes were path-dependently applying the previous closed-list fair dealing regime or simply concluding without discussion that the defendant’s use was neither an enumerated use nor
“such as” the enumerated uses.
Regardless of the explanation for why Israeli courts seem to
apply the Section 19(a) purpose test restrictively, Israeli doctrine
differs from that of the U.S. on this issue by imposing an additional
obstacle before defendants who claim fair use. Section 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act also prefaces the list of enumerated uses in the
preambular clause with the phrase “such as.” But in its definitions
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section, the U.S. Copyright Act provides explicitly that the “terms
‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not dispositive.”240
Accordingly, U.S. courts interpret Section 107 to set out a
fully open list of examples of the types of uses that can qualify as
fair use.241 U.S. courts occasionally state that the fact that the defendant’s use does not fall within one of the illustrative categories
of fair use weighs against fair use.242 However, Beebe concluded,
based on the regression model in his empirical study of U.S. fair use
case law, that “when controlling for the effects of other findings, a
finding that the defendant’s use fell within one of the preambular
categories did not significantly affect the outcome of the fair use
test.”243
d. Defendant’s Bad Faith

Our Israel Study found a statistically significant correlation
between fair use outcome and courts’ ruling on whether the defendant had used the plaintiff’s work in good faith. Israeli courts ruled in
favor of fair use in every one of the 4 cases in which the court found
that the defendant had acted in good faith and against fair use in
every one of the 12 cases in which the court found that the defendant
had not acted in good faith. But the fact that Israeli courts addressed
the issue of the defendant’s good faith in just 16 cases, slightly less
than a third of our data set, suggests that this factor has somewhat
weaker explanatory power for fair use outcomes than do the commercial character of the use, authorship credit, and a judicial finding
that the defendant’s use did not meet the purpose test.
Our U.S. Study found that the issue of whether the defendant
acted in good faith is quite marginal in the U.S. fair use doctrine. In
our U.S. Study, only 18 rulings (just under 10% of the total) addressed the issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith, and
of those, three rulings stated that the defendant’s good or bad faith
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is irrelevant to whether the defendant’s use qualifies as fair use.244
Likewise, Beebe’s empirical study of fair use cases found that, while
a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the copyright infringement defendant correlated significantly with the court’s rejection of
the fair use defense, only 16% of the cases made reference to the
propriety of the defendant’s conduct. Further, Beebe’s regression
analysis suggested that a finding of bad faith served little role in fair
use outcomes keeping other factors and subfactors constant.245
V. CONCLUSION
In campaigning against the adoption of fair use outside the
United States, the U.S. copyright industry warn policy makers
around the world that introducing fair use would undermine copyright protection. They contend that courts in other countries lack the
capacity to carefully craft the scope of a privileged use, and insist
that the adoption of fair use would thus lead to unrestrained copying.
Our empirical study of fair use case law in one country to
have adopted fair use outside the U.S., finds no evidence to substantiate these claims. We find, indeed, that during the first decade in
which Israel’s statutory fair use provision was in effect, Israeli
courts were quite restrained in accepting fair use defense compared
to their U.S. counterparts, rejecting fair use defenses in 70.9% of the
cases, compared with a mere 40.5% rejection rate by U.S. courts.
While the courts of other countries that adopt fair use might be more
receptive to fair use defenses than have Israeli courts, our case study
makes clear, at the very least, that the USTR should give no weight
to mere fact that a country has adopted fair use in determining
whether that country should face the threat of trade sanctions for
inadequate intellectual property protection.
Our study further reveals that, notwithstanding Israel’s enactment of statutory language that was almost identical to Section
107, Israeli courts developed an independent jurisprudence of fair
use, putting weight on factors that have generally played an insignificant role in determining fair use outcomes in the U.S. These factors include the commercial nature of the defendant’s use, the
defendant’s failure to give authorship credit, the purpose of use, and
the extent to which the defendant acted in bad faith. At the same
244
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time, however, the Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to
U.S. fair use case law for guidance. As we have discussed, indeed,
the Court’s recent ruling in Nestle might move Israeli fair use jurisprudence closer to that of the U.S. even if Nestle pronounced a
uniquely Israeli framework for the four statutory fair use factors.
Our findings may offer some important lessons to countries
considering the adoption of the fair use exception in their copyright
law. Most importantly, introducing a fair use provision need not, in
itself, lead to unrestrained copying. Far from being a license to unauthorized copying, fair use offers a conceptual framework for a sophisticated legal analysis weighing the conflicting values and
considerations promoted by copyright law.
Our study has further demonstrated that courts may play a
moderating role, even when empowered with broad discretion. Although fair use is an open-ended norm which seemingly accords
courts wide discretion, judicial decisions in our study reflected a
considerable degree of path dependency. Israeli courts followed a
relatively conservative approach that heavily relied on the legal tradition which preceded the Knesset’s enactment of fair use. Our findings suggest that, to a large extent, Israeli court’s interpretation of
the fair use provision looked to the fair dealing framework which
preceded the fair use reform. In particular, in part because of how
the Knesset drafted Section 19, Israeli courts have continued the fair
dealing distinction between the purpose test and the fairness test,
interpreting Section 19 to require the purpose of use as a precondition to fair use. U.S. courts have taken a different path in their interpretation of the statutory language of section 107.
This path dependency of courts should not come as a surprise. Judicial decisions are shaped by precedent and by briefs submitted by the litigants. The conceptual framework applied by judges
and litigators is further shaped by their training and experience under the previous law. Courts may play an important role in legal reform, but they are generally bounded by their legal tradition and
their local legal culture. Consequently, even broad discretion accorded to judges by an open-ended fair use norm, is unlikely to result in dramatic change overnight.
Finally, our findings underscore the role of courts in copyright reform, and their contribution to the integration of a legal transplant in local copyright law. While fair use opponents express
concern about delegating to courts a semi-legislative power to craft
copyright exemptions for new uses, our study suggests that courts
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are not only capable of carefully developing legal norms, but also of
doing so in a manner that is bound by local legal culture. This could
be an important feature in localizing global copyright norms.
We hope that our study inspires additional, companion studies
of how fair use has been applied in other countries that have adopted
the privilege. Such studies would shed greater light on how fair use
is actually transplanted outside the United States. They would provide the necessary empirical data to compare transplanting countries’ approaches to fair use with one another and with evolving fair
use doctrine in the United States.

